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Postliberalism and tariffs

It is important to emphasize first that the problem has nothing essentially to do with any dogmatic opposition to tariffs as such, much less with any general commitment to libertarian economics.  I am happy to acknowledge that tariffs can sometimes be a good idea, and my own approach to these issues is postliberal rather than libertarian or classical liberal (or “neoliberal,” “market fundamentalist,” or any of the other epithets being flung about in recent days). 

But neither postliberalism nor the fact that tariffs can sometimes be a good idea entails that they are always a good idea, or that the particular draconian tariff regime announced last week is a good idea.  This is not a matter that can be settled a priori by appeal to abstract principle.  It requires a judgement of prudence that takes account of myriad concrete and contingent circumstances.  Several thinkers representative of postliberalism or allied traditions of thought have affirmed that tariffs are of limited value and sometimes best avoided.  For example, the twentieth-century theologian Johannes Messner, a prominent exponent of Catholic Social Teaching, wrote:

[The] bilateral system [features] differential tariff agreements on the basis of reciprocity.  Its various forms are based on methods of protectionism, of safeguarding the individual national economy by measures to restrict imports.  The means employed to restrict imports [include] prohibitive tariffs… As was shown in the period between the wars… this entails a minimum of international economic cooperation, and nations have paid dearly for it by severe economic losses and chronic mass unemployment.  (Social Ethics, p. 952)

The Catholic distributist Hilaire Belloc, while defending protectionist tariff policy, nevertheless judges that “the argument in favour of Protection applies to particular cases only, and turns entirely upon whether an undeveloped part of the energies of the community can be turned into new channels or not” (Economics for Helen, p. 126).

Similarly, the contemporary postliberal political scientist Patrick Deneen, commenting in his 2023 book Regime Change on Trump’s predilection for tariffs, wrote:

Tariffs, however, are generally crude instruments, often used as much or more for domestic political advantage than true enhancements to national competitiveness.  Where necessary, tariffs can prevent dumping and counteract advantages that foreign manufacturers receive from public funding.  However, they should generally be a policy of last resort, focused especially on protecting national manufacture of essential goods such as pharmaceuticals and basic materials. (p. 179)

In response to Trump’s suggestion that tariffs might some day replace the income tax, postliberal journalist Sohrab Ahmari has written:

Replacing tax revenue with tariffs today isn’t workable, given the hugely expanded size and scope of the government.  And jacking up tariffs high enough to cover the cost would discourage most nations from trading with the US in the first place, thus creating a drastic revenue shortfall.

In a Newsweek article that appeared during the 2024 presidential campaign, postliberal economist Philip Pilkington, while agreeing with Trump that trade imbalances are a serious issue, doubted “whether increased tariffs and protectionism are the best way to deal with these imbalances.”  There are, he wrote, two problems with this approach:

The first is that it overestimates what protectionism can accomplish… Tariffs may well help protect domestic industries, but some in American policy circles seem convinced that imposing tariffs will also lead to a spontaneous regrowth of industries lost to globalization.  Many such industries are highly complex and require skills, know-how, transport infrastructure, and other inputs that take years – maybe even decades – to nurture and develop.  If the American government imposes tariffs on key sectors and American businesses have a hard time substituting the goods targeted by the tariffs, the result will simply be a sharp uptick in the price of the goods.

This leads us to the second problem.  The Trump campaign has signaled a desire to aggressively cut taxes, especially income taxes.  Such cuts would drastically boost the spending power of the average American consumer.  Yet if, at the same time, the government is restricting access to cheap foreign goods with higher tariffs, too much money will be chasing too few goods.  This is a recipe for inflation – perhaps very high inflation.

It is worth noting that the contemporary writers just mentioned are known for sympathizing with much of Trump’s agenda.  Naturally, none of this entails that a postliberal could not favor Trump’s tariff proposal, and some postliberals appear to do so.  The point is that there is nothing in postliberalism in itself that entails either accepting or rejecting it. 

But I’d add this caveat.  The “order” part of a postliberal order is no less essential than the “postliberal” part.  And the trouble is that, whatever one thinks in the abstract of a policy like Trump’s, its actual execution tends to chaos rather than order.

The trouble with the Trump tariffs

There are three basic sets of problems with Trump’s tariff plan, which concern its timing, conception, and execution.  Let’s consider each in turn.

1. Timing

The country has been battered by inflation for four years now.  Polls show that high prices were the primary concern both of Trump’s base and of the swing voters without whom he could not have won the recent election.  Trump made this a key campaign issue, pledging: “Starting on Day 1, we will end inflation and make America affordable again.”  Yet it is widely acknowledged, even among defenders of Trump’s tariffs, that they are likely to drive prices up even higher.  They have also driven the stock market down dramatically, with retirees dependent on 401(k) accounts being the hardest hit.  The result is that consumers will have to pay even more than the high prices they are already facing, with less money available to do so.

Even if the tariffs were otherwise defensible, it is clear that this would not be the time to impose them.  Politically, it is likely to be a disaster for Republicans, who will surely lose control of Congress next year if prices remain high.  But more importantly, it is simply unjust to impose greater economic hardship on a public that has already had enough of it, and to whom relief was promised – especially for the sake of a radical policy that is far from sure to achieve its goal, and even lacks a well-defined goal in the first place.

2. Conception

That brings us to the second problem.  As many critics have noted, despite the economic risks any bold tariff policy is bound to have, the new tariff regime is both draconian and poorly thought out.  Over 100 countries are targeted by the tariffs, some of which are very steep. 

But there seems to be no serious rationale for many of the specific amounts decided upon.  It appears that the administration’s basic formula not only does not make much economic sense, but has not even been applied correctly by the administration itself.  The policy focuses on trade imbalances, but a trade imbalance is not by itself necessarily harmful.  For example, a very poor country is bound to buy less from the wealthy United States than the U.S. buys from it.  But this no more entails that the U.S. is getting “screwed” by the poor country than the fact that a rich man buys more from a poor shopkeeper than the latter buys from the former entails that the shopkeeper is “screwing” the rich man.  Yet tiny Lesotho is being hit with a 50% tariff that will inflict vastly more economic damage on its people than any “harm” Lesotho could ever be imagined to have inflicted on the U.S.

Furthermore, Israel agreed prior to the announcement of the plan to drop all tariffs on U.S. goods, but was hit with a new tariff anyway.  The Taliban in Afghanistan got hit with a new tariff too, but a smaller one.  Russia faces no new tariffs, but Ukraine does.  Among others who face them are several small islands, including one we do not trade with and two that are uninhabited.  In some cases, the new tariffs conflict with existing trade agreements.

According to some explanations of the tariffs, they are meant as a short-term negotiating tactic.  According to others, they are intended to be permanent.  Naturally, the uncertainty this entails makes rational economic decision-making difficult, which is one reason the stock market has taken such a big hit.  It is also said that tariffs will yield great revenue for the U.S. government, allowing it to cut taxes and thereby relieve consumers hit with price increases.  But the more draconian a tariff regime is, the less trade there will be, which entails that the revenue the U.S. might in theory enjoy from tariffs will not be what it in fact collects.  Obviously, if you charge people 10% or 25% or 50% more for what you are selling, it doesn’t follow that you will actually make that much more money, because many potential buyers will simply decide not to buy.

It is said that the tariffs will bring back lost manufacturing jobs.  But a tariff cannot by itself do that.  If an industry already exists, protectionist policies like tariffs can shield it from foreign competition.  But if the industry no longer exists, a tariff won’t necessarily bring it back to life, any more than putting a bulletproof vest on a corpse will resuscitate it.  To be sure, the tariff may be among the conditions that make it easier for the industry to revive.  But other conditions (such as the relevant infrastructure and skilled labor) need to be put in place as well, and even when this is possible it can take many years.  There is also the fact that a tariff that on the surface appears to help American manufacturers can in fact hurt them.  If the product a U.S. manufacturer makes requires components that have to be imported from outside the U.S., then a tariff on those foreign components will drive costs up.  And there may be no domestic supplier that can replace the foreign one.

Lurking in the background of any draconian tariff proposal is, of course, memory of the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which is widely held to have deepened the Great Depression.  (It is an example of what Messner had in mind in the quote above, when he notes the grave economic damage that protectionist policies can inflict.)  While even a policy as extreme as Trump’s need not have such a dire outcome, many economists are worried that it will at least lead to a recession.

None of this entails that there is no serious case for tariffs of any kind.  That’s not the point.  The point is that a tariff policy as ambitious and risky as Trump’s should be thought out extremely carefully, and this one is instead haphazard and reckless.  Many Trump defenders will dismiss such concerns on ad hominem grounds, as the sort of thing dogmatic free marketers would want us to believe.  This is as silly as dismissing an argument in favor of a certain tariff simply on the grounds that it was given by a socialist.  Though as it happens, socialists no less than free marketers sometimes argue against particular tariffs, as, again, some postliberals do.  As I’ve said, the advisability of any particular tariff proposal does not stand or fall with one’s general philosophical or economic point of view.  In any event, what matters is whether an argument or an objection is correct or not, not who raised it.  This should be obvious, but in our hyper-partisan era, reminders of basic points of logic are constantly necessary.

Defenders of the tariff policy also routinely appeal to what has happened to the Rust Belt, and the benefits of restoring U.S. manufacturing jobs and capacities that have been lost.  But this fallaciously supposes that because the end or goal of a tariff policy is good, it follows that the policy itself must be a good means to achieve it.  This is as silly as arguing that communism must be good and achievable, because those who favor it have the good motive of helping poor and working people.  It also fails to consider other possible means to the ends the tariff policy is said to be motivated by.  For example, Deneen suggests in Regime Change that the U.S. manufacturing base can be bolstered without heavy reliance on tariffs, by government spending to support infrastructure, research and development, and relevant education.  And in the article linked to above, Pilkington proposes, in place of tariffs, new rules governing international trade.

3. Execution

As to the execution of the tariff policy, there are two basic problems.  The first is the intellectually and morally unserious manner in which it has been done.  Concerns like the ones I’ve set out are waved away rather than answered.  Trump dismisses those worried about the policy as “weak and stupid.”  The stock market dive and prospect of higher prices are dismissed as irrelevant by the same people who once pointed to the health of the stock market as evidence of the soundness of Trump’s policies, and to high prices as evidence of Biden’s incompetence.  Trump defenders who, twenty minutes ago, were proclaiming that he would liberate us from hard economic times are now calling on Americans to embrace austerity.

This is a grave failure of statesmanship.  Ordinary people, including many working class and elderly people who voted for Trump, are watching their retirement accounts shrink and already high prices looking to get higher, and are understandably frightened.  It is cruel to dismiss their concerns and smugly urge them to toughen up and tighten their belts, especially after having promised them immediate economic relief.  On top of that, this attitude only adds to the fear of looming disaster, because it reinforces the impression that the architects and advocates of the policy are driven by cold ideological fanaticism rather than good sense and concern for the common good.

And again, a rational economy needs predictability, and the stability that predictability presupposes.  But the manner in which Trump’s policy is being executed, no less than its actual content, undermines economic stability.

The second problem with the execution of Trump’s tariff policy concerns its dubious legality.  It is Congress, rather than the president, that has primary authority over tariff policy, and it is implausible to suppose that it has delegated to him authority to impose a tariff policy as draconian as the one announced.  It is also risible to pretend that we face some “emergency” that licenses such action, given that the purported emergency is merely the continuation of an economic order that has persisted for decades and through periods of high prosperity, including the period during his first term that Trump takes credit for.  What we seem to have here is a textbook case of the demagogic manufacture of an “emergency” to rationalize the acquisition of extraconstitutional power. 

It is also part of an alarming trend on Trump’s part toward ever more grandiose and indeed unhinged actions and statements.  This began at least as early as his absurd insistence in 2021 that Vice President Mike Pence had the constitutional authority to set aside the electoral votes of states Trump claims were stolen from him in the 2020 election.  It includes his recent bizarre obsession with annexing Canada; his insistence that Greenland too must be taken over by the U.S., possibly even by military force; his mad scheme to take ownership of the intractable Israel-Palestine conflict and forcibly relocate millions of Gazans; and his flirtation with seeking a third term, despite this being manifestly contrary to the constitution.  These are not the sorts of moves one would expect of a wise statesman motivated by concern for the common good.  But they are perfectly consistent with what one would expect of a prideful and vainglorious man whose cult of personality has blinded him to normal standards of decency and reasonableness.  Any reader of Plato and Aristotle will also recognize in them the marks of the sort of demagogue who tends to arise in the late stages of a democracy. 

It is possible that Trump’s arrogance will lead him to persist with his tariff policy no matter how destructive it may end up being, under the delusion that it simply must work in the long run, no matter how long or deeply the country has to suffer.  It is also perfectly possible that his sense of what is needed for self-preservation will lead him to change course.  If it does, we can expect him and his most ardent followers to declare vindication, as they always do no matter what the outcome.  But if the market recovers and a recession is avoided, that will not magically remove the grave defects with the plan and its execution that I’ve been describing here.  If I accidentally fire a gun in your direction but miss, it doesn’t mean that I didn’t put your life at risk, much less that I did something you should thank me for.

Causality

In Aquinas’s First Way, he famously argues that it is impossible for there to be an infinite series of movers or changers, so that a regress of changers must terminate in a first unchanging changer.  As I’ve discussed in many places (such as at pp. 69-73 of my book Aquinas), Aquinas is not claiming here that no causal series of any kind can regress infinitely.  Rather, he has in mind a specific sort of causal series, which commentators sometimes call “essentially ordered series” and sometimes “hierarchical series.”

He illustrates the idea with a stone which is moved by a stick which is in turn moved by a hand.  The stick moves the stone, but not by its own power.  By itself the stick would simply lay on the ground inertly.  It can move the stone only because the hand imparts to it the power to move it.  The hand too, of course, would be unable to move the stick (so that the stick in turn would be unable to move the stone) unless the person whose hand it is deliberately uses the hand to move it. 

The technical way of putting the point is that the stick is a secondary cause in that it has causal efficacy only insofar as it derives or borrows it from something else.  By contrast, the person who uses the stick is a primary cause insofar as his causal efficacy is built-in rather than being derivative or borrowed.  The stick is a moved mover insofar as it moves other things only because it is itself being moved in the process.  The person is an unmoved mover insofar as he can move the stick (and, through it, the stone) without something else having to move him in the process.

Aquinas gives other arguments against an infinite regress in such cases, but this is the one I want to focus on here.  The basic idea is that there cannot be secondary causes without a primary cause, because you cannot have borrowed or derivative causal power without something to borrow it from.  This would be true no matter how long the regress is, and it is important to note that infinity as such is not really what is doing the work here.  Even if we allowed for the sake of argument that the stone in our example was pushed by an infinitely long stick, there would still need to be something outside the stick to impart causal power to it.  For a stick is just not the sort of thing that could, all by itself, move anything else, no matter how long it is. 

Nor, for that matter, would it help if the causal series in this case went around in a circle rather than regressing to infinity – the stone moved by the stick which was moved by another stick which was moved by the stone, say.  For sticks and stones just aren’t the sorts of things that could move anything by themselves, even around in a circle.  There would have to be something outside this circle of movers that introduced motion into it.

Meaning

Now consider a second and at first glance very different sort of argument, which is associated with John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot) and was defended in the twentieth century by Francis Parker and Henry Veatch in their book Logic as a Human Instrument.  It appeals to a distinction between instrumental signs and formal signs.  An instrumental sign is a sign that is also something other than a sign.  Consider, for example, a string of words written in pen on a piece of paper.  It is a sign of the concept or proposition being expressed, but it is also something else, namely a collection of ink splotches.  Now, there is nothing intrinsic to it qua collection of ink splotches that makes it a sign.  By itself, a string of splotches that looks like “The cat is on the mat” is no more meaningful than a string of marks such as “FhjQns jkek$9 (quyea&b.” 

Suppose we say that the string of splotches that looks like “The cat is on the mat” has the meaning it has because of its relations to other strings of splotches, such as the ones we see in a dictionary when we look up the words “cat,” “mat,” etc.  That can hardly give us a complete explanation of how the first set of ink splotches get their meaning, because these new sets of splotches are, considered just by themselves, as meaningless as the first set.  They too have no intrinsic meaning, but have to derive it from something else.

Notice that we have a kind of regress here.  And what the argument says is that this regress must terminate in signs that do not get their meaning from their relations to other signs, but have it intrinsically.  This is what formal signs are.  And unlike instrumental signs, they must be signs that are not also something else – that is to say, they must be signs that are nothing but signs.  With a sign that is also something other than a sign (a set of ink splotches, or sounds, or pictures, or whatever), the meaning and this additional feature can come apart, which opens the door to the question of how the meaning and the additional feature get together.  But a sign that is nothing more than a sign just is its meaning.  Because it just is its meaning, it needn’t derive or borrow its meaning from something else.

The argument goes on to say that these formal signs are to be identified with our concepts and thoughts, which are the source of the meanings that words and sentences have.  This in turn provides the basis for an argument for the mind’s immateriality, as I discuss in Immortal Souls.  The point I want to emphasize for the moment, though, is that we have here an argument that holds that a regress of items having a certain feature in only a derivative way can exist only if there is something having that feature in a built-in or non-derivative way – which is, at a very general level, analogous to the reasoning Aquinas deploys in the First Way.

(As a side note, I’ll point out that John Haldane, in Atheism and Theism, develops a line of reasoning which might be seen as an amalgam of these two arguments.  A person’s potential for concept formation, he says, presupposes fellow members of a linguistic community who actualize this potential by virtue of already possessing concepts themselves.  But their potential to form these concepts requires the preexistence of yet other members of the linguistic community.  This regress can end only in a first member of the series, whose possession of concepts need not depend on actualization by previous members.  This “Prime Thinker” he identifies with God.)

Knowledge

A third line of argument, once again very different at first glance but ultimately similar in structure, concerns epistemic justification.  Consider the “problem of the criterion,” of which Michel de Montaigne gave a famous statement.  In order rationally to justify some knowledge claim, we will need to appeal to some criterion.  But that criterion will in turn have to be justified by reference to some further criterion, and that further criterion by reference to yet some other criterion, and so on ad infinitum.  It seems, then, that no judgment can ever be justified.

As the Neo-Scholastic philosopher Peter Coffey points out in his Epistemology or The Theory of Knowledge, the fallacy in this sort of argument lies in assuming that the justification for a judgment must in every case lie in something extrinsic to the judgment itself.  The skeptical argument fails if there are judgments whose criterion of justification is intrinsic to them. 

Now, suppose it can be established that we cannot fail to have at least some genuine knowledge.  One might argue, for example, that even the skeptic himself cannot coherently raise skeptical doubts without making certain presuppositions (such as the reliability of the rules of inference he deploys in arguing for skepticism).  Then we would have a basis for an argument like the following: We do at least have some knowledge; we could have no knowledge unless there were at least some judgments whose criterion of justification is intrinsic to them; therefore, there must be at least some judgments whose criterion of justification is intrinsic to them.

The point is not to expound or defend this sort of argument here.  The point is rather that such an argument would be a further instance of the general pattern we’ve seen in the other arguments.  In particular, it would be another case in which it is argued that there can be a regress of things having some feature in only a derivative way (in this case, epistemic justification) only if there is something having it in an intrinsic way.

Action

One last example, which concerns action.  Aristotle, and Scholastic writers like Aquinas following him, hold that every action is carried out for a certain good, and that good is often pursued only for the sake of some further good to which it is a means, which is itself pursued for the sake of yet some other good.  The regress this generates can terminate only in some end that is pursued for its own sake, as good in itself.  Naturally, there is a lot more than that to the analysis of action and the good, but the point is to emphasize that once more we see an instance of an argument fitting the same general pattern we’ve seen in other cases.  A regress of items having a certain feature only derivatively (in this case, goodness or desirability as an end) can terminate only in something that has that feature intrinsically.

Here are some features common to such arguments.  First, and to repeat, the basic general pattern is to argue that the existence of items having a certain feature in a borrowed or derivative way presupposes something having that feature in an intrinsic way.  In one case the feature in question is causal power, in another it is meaning, in another it is epistemic justification, and in yet another it is goodness or desirability.  But despite this significant difference in subject matter, the basic structure of the inference is the same.

Second, although the arguments are set up by way of a description of a regress of some kind, the length of the regress is not actually what is doing the key work in the arguments.  In particular, the arguments, on close inspection, are not primarily concerned to rule out infinities.  Rather, they are concerned to make the point that what is derivative ultimately presupposes what is intrinsic or non-derivative.  This would remain the case even if some sort of infinite sequence was allowed for the sake of argument.  For example, even an infinite series of causes having only derivative causal power would presuppose something outside the series which had intrinsic causal power; even an infinite sequence of instrumental signs would presuppose something outside the sequence that was a formal rather than merely instrumental sign; and so on.

Third, the arguments all essentially purport to identify something that must be true of metaphysical necessity.  They are not merely probabilistic in character, or arguments to the best explanation.  The claim is that there could not even in principle be secondary causes without primary causes, instrumental signs without formal signs, and so forth.  The arguments intend to identity the necessary preconditions of there being such a thing as causality, meaning, knowledge, or action. 

Hence, whether one accepts such an argument or not, the claims of empirical science are not going to settle the matter, because the arguments are conducted at a level deeper than empirical science.  The very practice of empirical science presupposes causality, meaning, knowledge, and action.  The arguments in question, since they are about the necessary preconditions of those things, are also about the necessary preconditions of science.  They are paradigmatically philosophical in nature.

The wager

Pascal begins with the assumption that unaided reason cannot establish one way or the other whether God exists.  I think he is quite wrong about that, since I hold that several of the traditional arguments for God’s existence are compelling.  But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Pascal is correct.  We still, he holds, must “wager” over whether God exists, either betting that he does or betting that he does not.  Yet how can reason decide what bet to make, if it cannot show whether it is theism or atheism that is more likely to be true?

In its simplest form, Pascal’s argument is this.  God either exists or he does not, and you can either bet that he does or bet that he does not.  Suppose you bet that he exists, and it turns out that he really does.  Then you will enjoy an infinite benefit, eternal life in heaven.  But suppose you bet that he exists and it turns out that he does not.  You will have been mistaken, but will have suffered no loss.  Of course, while someone who regards a devout and moral life to be of value in itself will agree with that, a more worldly person would not.  He would say that by mistakenly betting that God exists, he would deprive himself of worldly pleasures he could have enjoyed.  But even if one concedes this, Pascal holds, what one will have lost is still of relatively small value, and certainly of finite value.

Now suppose that one bets that God does not exist, and that in fact he does not.  Then, Pascal says, one will enjoy no gain from this.  Or, even if a worldly person suggests that he will have gained worldly pleasures from it, this would still be a relatively small gain, and certainly a finite gain.  But suppose that one bets that God does not exist and it turns out he is wrong – that God does in fact exist.  Then, says Pascal, he will suffer an infinite loss.  He will have lost out on the infinite reward of eternal life in heaven.

When we consider this cost-benefit analysis, concludes Pascal, we can see that the only rational wager to make is to bet that God exists.  Now, Pascal is aware that one cannot simply and suddenly make oneself believe in God, the way one might make the lights go on by flipping a switch.  But since it is reason that tells us to bet on God’s existence, the problem, he concludes, must be with our passions.  These are what prevent belief.  And they can be changed by throwing oneself into the religious life.  Doing so will gradually alter one’s passions, and in this way belief in God can be generated indirectly even though it cannot be produced directly by a simple act of will.

Mackie’s critique

Against all this, Mackie raises two main objections.  First, Pascal emphasizes that there is no affront to reason in his argument, and indeed that wagering that God exists is what reason dictates.  But this, says Mackie, is not the case, for Pascal’s advice to work up belief by way of molding one’s passions amounts to recommending self-deception.  Mackie notes that Pascal might respond by saying that what one is trying to work oneself into is really what amounts to a deeper wisdom or understanding.  But given Pascal’s own assumptions, argues Mackie, such a response would beg the question.  For whether belief in God does in fact reflect wisdom or understanding about how the world really is is precisely what Pascal acknowledges to be impossible to establish directly by rational arguments.

Second, says Mackie, Pascal’s argument can work only if the options we have to choose from are two, belief that God exists or the absence of such belief.  But in fact there are many more options than that.  We have to choose between Catholicism versus Protestantism, Christianity versus Islam or Hinduism, theism versus polytheism, and so on.  And once we realize that, we see that Pascal’s argument falls apart.  No cost-benefit analysis of the issue is going to give us anything like the crisp and clear advice he thinks it does.

Mackie’s second criticism overstates the case somewhat.  For not every religious view entails that one risks suffering an infinite loss by rejecting it.  Only religions that posit eternal damnation entail that.  And for purposes of Pascal’s reasoning, one need consider only religions of that kind, which narrows things down.  Still, Mackie’s basic point remains that there are more than just the two options considered by Pascal (since there is more than one religion that posits eternal damnation).

Are Mackie’s objections fatal?  It seems to me that that may depend on the epistemic situation of the person approaching Pascal’s wager scenario.  Suppose that, as far as you know, there really are no good rational grounds at all for preferring any one religion over another.  Given the evidence and argumentation available to you, none of them seems like a live option, any more than believing in elves or witches does.  In this case, Pascal’s Wager seems to have no value, for the reasons Mackie gives.  It cannot by itself give you a reason to opt for one among the variety of available religious options, and the exercise in artificially working up belief in one of them would seem to entail irrationally “suppressing one’s critical faculties,” as Mackie puts it (The Miracle of Theism, p. 202).  In short, as a strategy for rationally persuading the most unsympathetic sort of agnostic or atheist, Pascal’s Wager appears to fail.

Can it be salvaged?

However, suppose one is in a very different epistemic situation.  Suppose, for example, that one is not entirely certain that the arguments for God’s existence, Jesus’s resurrection, and other elements of Christian doctrine are correct, but still judges them to be strong and thinks that Christianity is at least very plausible.  Suppose that one considers further that among these doctrines is the teaching on original sin, according to which our rational and moral faculties have been damaged in such a way that it is much less easy for us to see the truth, or to even want to see it, than it would have been had we not suffered original sin’s effects.  Then one might judge that it may be that while he regards the evidences for Christianity to be strong, the reason he nevertheless remains uncertain is due to the damage his intellect and will have suffered as a result of original sin. 

His situation would be comparable to someone who judges that he is suffering from chronic delusions and hallucinations, like John Nash as portrayed by Russell Crowe in the movie version of A Beautiful Mind.  Nash has good reasons for holding that some of things he is inclined to believe and thinks that he sees are illusory.  Yet he finds he nevertheless cannot help but continue to see these things and be drawn to these paranoid beliefs.  Since, overall, the most plausible interpretation of the situation is that these nagging beliefs and experiences are delusional, he decides to refuse to take them seriously and to keep ignoring them until they go away, or at least until they have less attraction for him.  This is not contrary to reason, but rather precisely a way to restore reason to its proper functioning.

Similarly, the potential religious believer in my scenario judges that he has good reason to think that Christianity really is true, even though he is also nevertheless uncertain about it.  And he also judges that he has good reason to suspect that his lingering doubts may be due to the weaknesses of his intellect and will that are among the effects of original sin.  Suppose, then, that he appeals to something like Pascal’s Wager as a way of resolving the doubts.  He judges that Christianity is plausible enough that he would suffer little or no loss if he believed in it but turned out to be mistaken, and little or no benefit if he disbelieved in it and turned out to be correct.  And he also judges it plausible that the potential reward for believing would be infinite, and the potential loss for disbelief also infinite.  So, he wagers that Christianity is true.

Like Nash in A Beautiful Mind, he resolves to ignore any nagging doubts to the contrary, throwing himself into the religious life and thereby molding his passions and cognitive inclinations until the doubts go away or at least become less troublesome.  And like Nash, he judges that this is in no way contrary to reason, but rather precisely a way of restoring reason to its proper functioning (given that the doubts are, he suspects, due to the lingering effects of original sin). 

In this sort of scenario, then, it’s not that the Wager by itself takes someone from initially finding God’s existence in no way likely, all the way to having a rational belief in God’s existence.  That, as I’ve agreed with Mackie, is not plausible.  Rather, in my imagined scenario, reason has already taken the person up to the threshold of a solid conviction that God exists, and the Wager simply pushes him over it. 

No doubt, even this attributes to reason a greater efficacy in deciding about theological matters than Pascal himself would have been willing to acknowledge.  But, tentatively, I judge it the most plausible way for the Pascalian to try to defend something like the Wager argument, at least against Mackie’s objections.  (And I don’t claim more for it than that.  Naturally, there is a larger literature on the argument that I do not pretend to have addressed here.)

Pope Francis publicly honored the blasphemous “artist” named Andres Serrano, who created the sacriligious image of a crucifix of Jesus immersed in human urine.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
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The post 999: Pope Francis Honors evil PISS CHRIST Artist at Vatican [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Pope Francis investigates Bishop Strickland – Dr. Taylor Marshall Podcast Pope Francis has ordered an “apostolic visitation” of Bishop Joseph Strickland of Tyler Texas. Dr. Taylor Marshall gives details.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 998: Pope Francis investigates Bishop Strickland [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Elon Musk has endorsed Jim Caviezel and Eduardo Verástegui’s new film Sound of Freedom, and has encouraged them to stream it on Twitter!

“I recommend putting it on this platform for free for a brief period or just asking people to subscribe to support (we would not keep any funds).”

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 997: Elon Musk endorses Jim Caviezel’s film Sound of Freedom [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Watch this new podcast episode by clicking here:

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 995: Have the LA Dodgers Offended Catholic Nuns? [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

President of Ukraine Zelensky gave to Pope Francis an icon of the Mother of God with the Child Jesus. According to Zelenskyy, this should mean the loss of Ukrainian children in the conflict. According to Italian journalists, the behavior of the Ukrainian leader and the gifts presented could indicate the failure of negotiations between him and the pope.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 993: Zelensky Blacks-Out Jesus on Icon Offends Pope Francis and Christians! [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Thank you for visiting my site. I am currently gathering people who are interested in shifting the political discussion toward natural law and Christian principles. By proposing a bid for the office of President of the United States, I am trying to rally Christians around a political vision that acknowledges Christ as King over our government, schools, families, and culture.

In the next few weeks, I will begin meeting with leaders, clergy, lawyers, and advisors to build a cultural platform in honor of “Christ the King.” If you would like to engage and be involved, please share your email address and/or number below. I will not sell or share your information. You have my word. I will use your email only to be in touch with you regarding this platform.

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Thank you for subscribing. I look forward to being in touch with you.

ad Christum Regem!

Dr. Taylor Marshall

The post Engage with Dr. Taylor Marshall about shifting political discourse: Christ the King Platform appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Dr. Taylor Marshall and his twin daughters host Friday Bible Q&A.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 991: Is getting drunk a sin? Do we worship Mary? Bible Q&A with Marshall Twins and Dr. Taylor Marshall [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Tucker Carlson announced Tuesday that he will relaunch his former FOX News program on Twitter, which he extolled as the only large free-speech platform in the world after Fox News fired him late last month.

Carlson made the announcement in a video posted on Twitter, which Elon Musk acquired last year. Musk said Twitter did not sign an agreement with Carlson for his new show.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 989: Tucker Carlson Relaunches Show on TWITTER! Is it a bad idea? [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Dr. Taylor Marshall discusses the dangers of transhumanism and the 5 ways it is directed to your children.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 988: 5 Ways Transhumanism is Directed to Your Kids [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Charles Coulombe joins Dr. Taylor Marshall to discuss today’s coronation of King Charles III. Should Catholics celebrate it? How does a Catholic understand the idea of a “heretical king”?, plus more.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 987: Is Crowning of King Charles Good or Bad? Nuance? With Charles Coulombe! [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Dr. Taylor Marshall discusses the feast day of Saint Joseph the Worker.

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 986: Is St Joseph the Worker a Communist or Anti-Communist Feast Day? [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Taylor and Jesse on Satanists “consecrate” Boston: Where are the Bishops?

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 985: Taylor and Jesse on Satanists “consecrate” Boston: Where are the Bishops? [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

In this video, we’ll explore what lies at the bottom of the nine layers of hell in Dante’s INFERNO with the help of he analysis of Dr. Taylor Marshall. We’ll discuss the different themes in this poem, and how it all relates to Christianity.

If you’re curious about the Bible, Dante, or hell, this video is for you! Dr. Taylor Marshall will explore the different layers of hell, and what lies at the bottom. We’ll also discuss the importance of this poem and its relation to Christianity. So if you’re interested in learning more about Dante’s INFERNO, then be sure to check out this video!

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 984: Dante’s INFERNO: What Lies at the Bottom of 9 Layers of HELL? [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.

Pope Francis has supported the “Abrahamic House of Worship”, which looks like “Ecumenical Epcost Center” for Muslims, Jews, and Catholics. Matt Gaspers and Dr. Taylor Marshall discuss this abomination while citing Gospel of John, 1 John, and 2 John..

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• Dr. Taylor Marshall’s newest book: Antichrist and Apocalypse: The 21 Prophecies of Revelation Unveiled and Described
• Also get his #1 Bestselling book: Infiltration: The Plot to Destroy the Church from Within
• Become a Patron of this Podcast: https://www.patreon.com/drtaylormarshall
• Take online classes with Dr. Marshall at the New Saint Thomas Institute. Please visit newsaintthomas.com to enroll.

The post 982: Pope Francis approves Abomination: Muslim-Jewish-Catholic House of Worship [Podcast] appeared first on Taylor Marshall.