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Oman is known for its pragmatic, neutral, and peaceful policies – what’s the significance of its rapidly-growing friendship with Moscow?

The Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, is planning a visit to Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

This visit carries particular significance against the backdrop of a new phase in nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, in which Oman is once again playing the role of mediator. The country’s involvement reaffirms its status as one of the few neutral and respected actors in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Historically, Oman has repeatedly demonstrated a unique ability to serve as a reliable and impartial intermediary in international conflicts – especially in the complex and sensitive context of US-Iran relations. Thanks to its balanced foreign policy, non-interference doctrine, and ability to maintain the trust of adversarial parties, Muscat has become an indispensable channel for confidential diplomacy in the Persian Gulf region.

Perhaps the most prominent example of this role came in 2013, when Oman hosted secret direct talks between the US and Iran. At the time, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, renowned for his personal commitment to peacebuilding, provided a discreet venue for initiating dialogue between the two sides. These meetings, conducted under strict confidentiality, proved to be a turning point and laid the groundwork for subsequent multilateral negotiations that ultimately led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, colloquially known as the Iran Nuclear Deal) – widely regarded as one of the most significant achievements in international diplomacy in the past decade. Analysts at Christian Science Monitor and Foreign Policy referred to Sultan Qaboos as “the architect of backchannel diplomacy,” without whom the deal in its final form would likely have been impossible.

Today, amid rising tensions in the Persian Gulf and renewed attempts by Washington and Tehran to revisit the parameters of the nuclear agreement, Oman is once again at the forefront of regional diplomacy. From 2023 to 2025, Muscat hosted a series of closed-door, indirect meetings between Iranian and American representatives, as confirmed by sources within Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and unnamed US officials. These consultations, facilitated by Oman, allowed the parties to discuss mechanisms for limiting Iran’s nuclear program, the phased lifting of sanctions, and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to reports from WANA News Agency and Middle East Eye, Oman has been actively advancing its own diplomatic proposals, including the establishment of a contact group and a neutral verification mechanism. It has also put forward the idea of a regional dialogue on security and energy stability. Through these efforts, Muscat is positioning itself not merely as a mediator, but as a key architect in shaping a new security framework for the Persian Gulf.

What sets Oman’s approach apart is its lack of aggressive ambition, its consistent multi-vector diplomacy, and its ability to combine discreet backchannel efforts with open support for peaceful initiatives. Unlike most states in the region, Muscat maintains working relationships with both Washington and Tehran, avoids one-sided political alliances, and leverages its neutrality in favor of dialogue. This makes Oman an especially valuable partner in the eyes of the international community, which seeks to avert direct confrontation between two long-standing geopolitical rivals.

Oman’s role in these negotiations goes beyond technical mediation – it is strategic in nature. Omani diplomacy aims not only to ease tensions but to establish a sustainable foundation for regional balance. Amid ongoing geopolitical turbulence, Muscat offers a model of “quiet strength,” grounded in dialogue, diplomatic flexibility, and strategic patience.

Thus, Oman’s efforts to revive the US-Iran dialogue reaffirm its status as a unique and indispensable mediator in the Middle East. The Sultanate once again demonstrates that even a relatively small state can play a crucial role in global affairs – provided it possesses trust, a solid reputation, and the ability to listen to all sides of a conflict. Oman’s diplomatic activity strengthens its position not only as a regional moderator but also as a key international partner capable of playing a constructive role in addressing global challenges.

Russia and Oman: On the path toward a world majority

Over the past two years, bilateral relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the Russian Federation have significantly deepened, reaching the level of strategic importance. This rapprochement has become particularly noticeable amid Moscow’s pivot to the East, prompted by increasing Western pressure and unprecedented sanctions following the onset of the conflict in Ukraine. In this new context, Russia is actively seeking reliable partners outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere – and Oman, with its stable domestic politics and carefully calibrated diplomacy, has emerged as a valuable foothold in the Middle East.

For Moscow, the Sultanate represents not only a promising economic partner but also a key political asset that contributes to regional balance and security in the Persian Gulf. Oman’s stance is traditionally characterized by moderation and a refusal to engage in confrontational alliances – qualities that make Muscat a trusted and respected intermediary on both regional and international issues.

For its part, Muscat views the strengthening of ties with Russia as an essential component of its multi-vector foreign policy, which emphasizes maximum flexibility and autonomy. This approach is particularly relevant in an era of growing instability in the Middle East and deepening polarization in international affairs. Despite its historically close ties with the US and the UK, Oman is increasingly charting an independent course. The influence of Western powers in the Sultanate has gradually waned – a trend that became especially apparent after the launch of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in October 2023. Western support for those actions, particularly from the US and several European nations, sparked public outrage in Oman and intensified domestic calls for a reassessment of the country’s traditional foreign policy priorities.

An additional factor driving Oman’s gradual shift away from its traditional dependence on the West is the country’s active expansion of cooperation with emerging global powers – particularly China and India. These nations are not only increasing their economic and energy footprint in the region but are also expanding military cooperation through joint exercises and security initiatives. This multipolar orientation enables Muscat to strengthen its bargaining position while minimizing the risks associated with alignment to a single geopolitical axis.

Oman has long pursued an independent foreign policy, carefully balancing relations with leading regional and global powers. Muscat seeks to build relationships founded on mutual respect, non-interference, and shared benefit – qualities that make it a vital mediator and diplomatic platform in some of the world’s most complex international conflicts. Adhering to the principle of “friendly neutrality,” Oman remains open to dialogue with all sides: its territory hosts both British and Chinese military facilities, and in recent years, joint exercises have been conducted with the armed forces of the US, China, Iran, and Russia. Until recently, Oman also maintained discreet lines of communication with Israel, though Muscat refrains from publicizing such contacts – especially amid rising tensions in the region.

At the same time, the Sultanate remains firmly committed to its policy of non-intervention and abstention from military coalitions. A telling example came in January 2024, when Muscat denied Western allies the use of its airspace and ports for operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Despite allegations of indirectly facilitating arms transfers, Omani authorities maintained a calm and measured stance, emphasizing that their priority remains regional peace and stability – not entanglement in geopolitical rivalries.

Under the leadership of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, Oman’s foreign policy has become even more pragmatic and multi-vector. The Sultanate’s leadership stresses the importance of developing diversified economic and diplomatic partnerships, especially with Eastern powers such as Russia, China, and Iran. This direction is complemented by efforts to strengthen ties with regional partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Such an approach enables Muscat to maintain resilience amid rising instability, competition, and polarization on the international stage.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, Oman has maintained a position of restraint, advocating for a diplomatic resolution while refraining from public support for either side. In an interview with Le Figaro, Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al-Busaidi emphasized that Muscat avoids accusatory rhetoric, stating, “Accusations rarely contribute to peace.” Instead, Omani diplomacy focuses on mediation and dialogue. Demonstrating its independent stance, the Sultanate declined to participate in the 2024 “peace summit” on Ukraine held in Switzerland, once again affirming its neutral yet active position.

The growing importance of Russia-Oman relations became especially evident in 2023–2024, as political and economic contacts between the two countries reached unprecedented levels. In May 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Oman for the first time in seven years, holding talks on key issues of regional security and bilateral cooperation. In July, Oman’s Foreign Minister made a reciprocal visit to Moscow to attend the “Russia–GCC” meeting – marking a symbolic step in the rapprochement between Russia and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

In September, Muscat hosted a high-level Russian delegation led by Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, which included representatives from Rosatom, the Central Bank, and Russian security and energy agencies – signaling serious plans to deepen cooperation in critical sectors.

In December 2023, Crown Prince and Minister of Sports Dhi Yazan bin Haitham Al Said visited Moscow, where he held talks with Putin and discussed youth and cultural exchange initiatives. In 2024, Russia also welcomed the Chairman of Oman’s State Council, Abdulmalik Al-Khalili, and the Speaker of the Consultative Council, Khalid bin Hilal Al-Maawali – underscoring Oman’s interest in institutionalizing inter-parliamentary dialogue and expanding political cooperation. Oman’s participation as a guest of honor at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, with one of the largest delegations, symbolized the growing strategic significance of the bilateral partnership.

All of this reflects the shared ambition of Muscat and Moscow to build not merely ad hoc cooperation, but durable and stable relations based on mutual respect, pragmatism, and the joint pursuit of an alternative framework for international engagement in an era of global transformation.

Deepening economic ties: The path to a reliable partnership

In recent years, economic cooperation between Russia and Oman has shown steady positive momentum, reaching a qualitatively new level and increasingly taking on the features of a strategic partnership. This collaboration aligns with the broader trend of Russia’s pivot to the East in its foreign economic policy and its effort to expand ties with key players in the Persian Gulf. Amid growing global instability and sanctions pressure, Moscow and Muscat are prioritizing a stable and mutually beneficial economic convergence, supported by practical initiatives and high-level engagement.

Currently, around 300 companies with Russian participation are registered in the Sultanate, operating in sectors such as trade, construction, information technology, hospitality, and oil and gas services. Particularly notable is the rising interest from Russian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seeking new markets and alternative logistics routes. A significant milestone in 2023 was the visit of a delegation of 39 Russian companies, organized by the Russian Export Center. The visit resulted in the signing of several preliminary agreements in areas such as food supplies, mechanical engineering, and medical technologies, as well as the launch of joint investment project discussions in Oman’s free economic zones.

By the end of 2024, Oman had secured its position as one of Russia’s fastest-growing trade partners in the Arab world. Bilateral trade reached $350 million, more than doubling compared to the previous three years. The trade portfolio includes Omani exports of fertilizers, petrochemical products, and aluminum, while Russia supplies food products, timber, metals, machinery, and chemical goods. Logistics cooperation is also gaining momentum – with new container shipping routes between Omani ports and southern Russia beginning to form alternative supply chains that bypass unstable transit regions.

For the first time in 2023, official data on mutual investments was released. According to the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, total investments amounted to $90 million – indicating the emergence of a stable financial and investment platform. Priority areas include agro-industrial development, green energy, digital technologies, infrastructure, and logistics. Plans are also underway to establish a joint investment fund and explore settlement mechanisms in national currencies using digital solutions, including cryptographically secured platforms – particularly relevant amid restrictions on dollar-based transactions.

Tourism is developing particularly dynamically, as one of the most flexible and rapidly scalable sectors of cooperation. In 2024, approximately 11,000 Omani tourists visited Russia, while the number of Russian citizens choosing the Sultanate as a travel destination reached a record 44,000. Oman’s active promotion on the Russian market as a “premium Eastern destination” is supported by improved infrastructure, the introduction of electronic visas, and the launch of new Oman Air routes, including flights to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sochi.

Russia–Oman cooperation holds vast potential across several strategic areas. Trade and investment remain key sectors, with a focus on the complementarity of export and import profiles – ranging from food and seafood to chemical, medical, and pharmaceutical products. Cooperation in the oil and gas sector extends beyond raw material exchange: joint geological exploration projects, the localization of service operations, and the implementation of digital solutions in extraction and processing are actively under discussion. Further areas of development include energy efficiency, water purification, waste management, and environmental protection – particularly within the framework of a shared climate agenda.

Education, science, and innovation also represent promising avenues of collaboration. Negotiations are underway to establish joint research centers and facilitate exchanges of students, faculty, and experts in petrochemicals, IT, medicine, and engineering. Topics under discussion include the mutual recognition of academic degrees, dual-degree programs, and joint startup incubators.

The fields of digitalization and fintech deserve special attention. Oman has shown keen interest in Russian technologies related to cybersecurity, blockchain, digital identity, and cashless payment systems. At the same time, Russian banks and financial institutions view Oman as a promising platform for piloting and deploying new tools, thanks to the region’s favorable regulatory environment and geoeconomic flexibility.

The upcoming visit of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq to Moscow promises to be a significant milestone in the evolution of Russia–Oman relations. It will reflect not only the high level of mutual trust and political understanding already achieved but also open new horizons for strategic convergence. Amid a profound transformation of the global order, Muscat and Moscow are demonstrating a shared commitment to building a sustainable, multidimensional partnership based on respect for sovereignty, pragmatism, and mutual benefit. In this context, Oman emerges not merely as an important regional player, but as a full-fledged ally in the shaping of a multipolar world – a country with which Russia envisions long-term political, economic, and humanitarian priorities.

Washington reportedly plans to pressure nations seeking tariff relief to reign in their turnover with Beijing

Beijing has issued a warning to countries considering limiting their trade with China in hopes of gaining tariff relief from the US, saying it will retaliate against any such moves.

The administration of US President Donald Trump plans to pressure other countries into limiting trade with China, including imposing monetary sanctions, in return for better trade terms, according to media reports.

China “firmly opposes any party reaching a deal at the expense of China’s interests,” the Commerce Ministry said in a statement on Monday, adding that Beijing would “resolutely take countermeasures.”

Washington’s tariff standoff with Beijing comes amid a broader US campaign targeting dozens of countries. While most of the elevated tariffs were paused for 90 days, allowing for trade negotiations, China was excluded from the reprieve. The total tariff on Chinese goods has been hiked to 145%.

“Appeasement will not bring peace, and compromise will not earn respect,” the ministry said. “Seeking so-called exemptions by harming the interests of others for one’s own selfish and shortsighted gains is like negotiating with a tiger for its skin. In the end, it will only lead to a lose-lose situation.”

The Wall Street Journal reported last week, citing unnamed sources, that the Trump administration aims to use tariff negotiations to pressure US trading partners to limit ties with China.

The plan reportedly involves blocking Chinese goods from transiting through their countries, preventing Chinese firms from relocating to avoid US duties, and rejecting cheap Chinese industrial imports.

Trump has not officially stated he would pressure countries to curb trade with China, but the president has suggested openness to the idea.

“Maybe, yeah, maybe,” Trump told Fox News last week, when he was asked whether Latin American countries should be forced to choose between Chinese and US investment. “They should do that.”

Since the escalation of trade tensions with the US, China has been actively strengthening its ties with other countries, engaging with officials from the EU, Japan, and South Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping toured Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia last week, where he signed a series of bilateral cooperation agreements and reaffirmed China’s commitment to free and open trade.

“The fact is, nobody wants to pick a side,” Bo Zhengyuan, partner at China-based policy consultancy Plenum told NBC News.

“If countries have high reliance on China in terms of investment, industrial infrastructure, technology know-how and consumption, I don’t think they’ll be buying into US demands. Many Southeast Asian countries belong to this category,” he added.

Giving unhoused individuals the deadly synthetic opioid could eliminate vagrancy, Rex Parris reportedly claimed

A mayor in Southern California is facing a backlash after suggesting the city of Lancaster could address homelessness by providing vagrants with “all the fentanyl they want,” according to the Los Angeles Times. The US has been grappling with a severe opioid crisis.

Originally developed for severe pain management, fentanyl is 50 times more potent than heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine.

Illicitly manufactured fentanyl has flooded the US drug market, and more than 74,000 Americans died in 2023 from drug mixtures containing the substance, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, nearly double the total number of motor vehicle fatalities tallied that year and over three times the number of reported homicides.

Mayor Rex Parris of Lancaster, California sparked controversy during a February city council meeting after a resident criticized the city’s plan to deal with homelessness by confining them to an abandoned golf course near a residential area, the outlet said on Sunday.

According to footage from the meeting, Parris interrupted the woman’s remarks, saying, “what I want to do is give them free fentanyl.”

“I mean, that’s what I want to do. I want to give them all the fentanyl they want.”

The startled resident responded to the Republican mayor, saying his comment “was not kind.”

Parris, who has served as mayor since 2008, told FOX LA on Friday that he has no “regrets” about his remarks. He clarified that he was referring specifically to unhoused individuals involved in criminal activity who “refuse” assistance, and reiterated his stance on providing them with the highly addictive and often deadly opioid.

“I made it very clear I was talking about the criminal element that were let out of the prisons that have now become 40 to 45% of what’s referred to as the homeless population,” Parris told the outlet.

“They are responsible for most of our robberies, most of our rapes, and at least half of our murders,” he added, without providing any evidence or data to support his claims.

Parris went on to say he hadn’t thought anyone would take his comments “literally,” claiming that fentanyl is “so easy” to obtain on the streets that offering it for free wouldn’t make any difference.

“Quite frankly, I wish that the president would give us a purge. Because we do need to purge these people,” Parris concluded.

In 2013, the Lancaster mayor made headlines for proposing building a Buddhist temple to attract Chinese investment. In 2018, he drew attention again with a push to ban neckties from workplace, citing studies linking them to reduced blood flow to the brain.

Washington reportedly seeks US control over Russia’s Zaporozhye facility

The US intends to assert control over the Russian territory surrounding Europe’s largest nuclear power plant as part of a mediated agreement between Kiev and Moscow, according to the Wall Street Journal. The proposal is part of a reported package of options that the US expects Ukraine to respond to by the end of this week.

Last Thursday, senior members of US President Donald Trump’s administration met with Ukrainian and European officials in Paris. One of their ideas aimed at facilitating a peace agreement between Kiev and Moscow involves designating the land around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant (NPP) as neutral territory under US control, the newspaper reported Sunday, citing anonymous sources.

The former Ukrainian region hosting the facility voted to join Russia in 2022, though Kiev has dismissed the referendum as a sham. In March, Trump claimed that Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky had proposed that the US take ownership of his country’s nuclear power plants. Zelensky, however, refuted this assertion, stating that he and Trump only discussed potential US investments in the Zaporozhye NPP.

Additionally, Washington has suggested recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea, not opposing Russian control over four other former Ukrainian regions, including Zaporozhye, and rejecting Ukraine's bid for NATO membership, according to the WSJ.

However, the list of proposals does not include any cap on the strength of the Ukrainian army or ban on troop deployments by European NATO members in Ukraine, the newspaper noted. If the US, its European allies, and Ukraine achieve a “convergence” this week, the package will be presented to Moscow, the WSJ reported.

Moscow has firmly rejected any proposed NATO presence in Ukraine and has asserted that the Istanbul agreement — a truce proposal negotiated in 2022 that includes limitations on the Ukrainian military — should serve as the foundation for a future peace accord. This plan was rejected by Kiev following intervention from then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

Russia has accused the EU and the UK of attempting to undermine Trump’s mediation efforts in order to prolong the conflict in Ukraine. The US president has cautioned that his administration would “just take a pass” if the diplomatic effort becomes too challenging.

The pontiff has passed away at the age of 88, the Vatican has announced

The head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, has died at the age of 88, the Vatican has announced.

Francis began his papacy in March 2013 and was the first pontiff from Latin America. 

“At 7:35 this morning, the Bishop of Rome, Francis, returned to the home of the Father. His entire life was dedicated to the service of the Lord and of his Church,″ Cardinal Kevin Farrell, the Vatican camerlengo, said in a statement on Monday morning.

Pope Francis “taught us to live the values of the Gospel with faithfulness, courage, and universal love, especially for the poorest and most marginalized,” Farrell wrote.

“With immense gratitude for his example as a true disciple of the Lord Jesus, we commend the soul of Pope Francis to the infinite, merciful love of God, One and Tribune,″ the cardinal added.

Pope Francis was last seen in public on Easter Sunday when he attended the Holy Mass at St. Peter’s Square in the Vatican.

READ MORE: Doctor reveals how close Pope came to death

His traditional Easter address was delivered by a member of the clergy due to the pontiff’s poor health. Afterwards, the Pope got out of his wheelchair and waved to the cheering crowd from the balcony of St. Peter’s Basilica, saying: “Dear brothers and sisters, happy Easter.”

Earlier on Sunday, the head of the Catholic Church held a meeting with US Vice President J.D. Vance during which he reportedly “lectured” Vance on compassion.

Pope Francis had been discharged from hospital in March after five weeks of treatment for an infection that led to him contracting double pneumonia.

The pontiff was born Jorge Mario Bergoglio in the Argentinian capital, Buenos Aires, in 1936. He was ordained as a Catholic priest in the late 1960s, and became the archbishop of Buenos Aires in 1998. He was created a cardinal by Pope John Paul II in 2001.

During his 12-year papacy, Francis positioned himself as a critic of capitalism and globalization and a defender of the poor and disadvantaged. He criticized extravagance and privilege within the Vatican, calling on cardinals and priests to show humility.

The pontiff also repeatedly urged the international community to implement reforms to tackle climate change and labeled the possession of nuclear weapons “immoral.”

His attempts to make the Catholic Church more inclusive caused controversy, with the Pope saying in 2023 that “being homosexual is not a crime.” Earlier this year, Francis allowed gay men to become priests in Italy. He also prompted women to more important, decision-making roles within the Сhurch.

Pope Francis also attempted to address the issue of child sex abuse by Catholic clerics, although there are contradicting views on how successful his efforts were.

He worked towards improving relations between the Catholic Church and other religious denominations, visiting the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq as well as meeting with Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill in 2016, in the first such event of its kind.

Berlin must send a “warning signal” to Russia, says Andrey Melnik

Germany should donate 30% of its available armored vehicles and military aircraft to Kiev, according to Andrey Melnik, Ukraine’s envoy to the UN. His appeal comes as the EU seeks to allay uncertainty over whether US President Donald Trump will continue to back Ukraine.

Melnik, who served as Kiev's ambassador to Berlin from 2015 to 2022, addressed his plea in an open letter to Chancellor-designate Friedrich Merz, published in Welt am Sonntag on Saturday. “It is in your hands, as peacemakers, to stop this damn war by the end of 2025,” he wrote.

The diplomat outlined a series of steps he believes Merz must take to “cut the Gordian knot and force [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to make peace.”

According to Melnik, Germany should donate 30% of its Bundeswehr stock of armored vehicles and aircraft to Kiev, including around 45 Eurofighter Typhoon and 30 Tornado fighter jets, 100 Leopard 2 main battle tanks, and 115 Puma and 130 Marder infantry fighting vehicles. He also called on Berlin to defy “the expected resistance” from the Social Democrats (SPD) and send 150 Taurus cruise missiles.

The SPD has opposed the missile deliveries, citing concerns about further escalation with Russia. The Social Democrats and Merz’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) are currently engaged in coalition talks.

Melnik urged Germany to commit 0.5% of its GDP, or €21.5 billion ($24.5 billion) annually, toward military aid to Ukraine through 2029. “These funds should be invested in the production of state-of-the-art weapons in both Germany and Ukraine,” he wrote. He also called for the 0.5% benchmark to be adopted across the EU as a “huge warning signal” to Russia.

Merz recently expressed an openness to delivering Taurus missiles, prompting criticism from SPD leader Matthias Miersch and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. Meanwhile, Russian Ambassador to Germany Sergey Nechayev warned that such shipments would “bring no changes to the battlefield” but would further implicate Germany in the conflict.

A broadcast from a “military camp for children” featured a child wearing an imperial eagle patch

German state broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) spotted a Nazi insignia while reporting from what it claimed to be a “secret military camp” for children in Ukraine.

A report about Ukrainian children “being trained for war in military-style boot camps” on Thursday featured children as young as ten learning to shoot military-grade weapons, provide first aid, and train in hand-to-hand combat.

“Ukrainians realize the war may continue for many years - and they want to be prepared. Today’s children may just be tomorrow’s soldiers,” DW reported.

One of the teenagers appears to be wearing a patch with a stylized Nazi German imperial eagle, which is briefly seen in the video on his shoulder. Unlike the original Reichsadler, who carried the swastika in its claws, the eagle in the patch appears to be clutching the trident from the Ukrainian coat of arms.

The original Reichsadler with the Nazi swastika is considered a symbol of an “unconstitutional organization” in Germany, and its display outside the contexts of “art or science, research or teaching” is illegal.

Versions of the symbol has been extremely popular among Ukrainian servicemen, and have repeatedly been spotted in official propaganda materials - only to be quietly removed after critics spot them.

Other controversial symbols, ranging from patches of various SS units, assorted neo-Pagan and neo-Nazi symbols to swastikas, have been repeatedly spotted on uniforms of Ukrainian servicemen as well.

The need to “denazify” Ukraine was among the goals proclaimed by Moscow at the very beginning of its special military operation against Kiev in February 2022.

Kiev has long denied the presence of any neo-Nazi elements in the country’s military, as well as any broader issues with the ideology in the country, dismissing any assertions on the matter as “Russian propaganda.”

Incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said he could ditch his predecessor’s policy and give Kiev long-range Taurus missiles

Germany has announced a new package of military aid for Ukraine, which includes armored vehicles, air-defense rockets, and howitzers, among other weaponry. Earlier this month, incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz indicated that he might break Berlin’s self-imposed taboo on providing Kiev with long-range rockets – a remark that drew a stern warning from Moscow.

On Thursday, the German government published an updated list of arms and military equipment it has shipped to Ukraine.

According to the statement, “in total, the Federal Republic of Germany has so far provided or committed for future years military assistance with a value of approximately 28 billion euro,” with around €5.2 billion ($5.9 billion) worth of supplies coming from the German military’s own stocks.

Additionally, “more than 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers have received military training in Germany” since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Berlin estimated.

The latest batch encompasses a number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP), ammunition for Leopard 2 tanks as well as Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and missiles for IRIS-T SLM air-defense systems.

Berlin also supplied Kiev with several Zuzana 2 self-propelled howitzers, 155mm and 122mm artillery rounds, reconnaissance and strike drones, as well as man-portable anti-tank weapons and assault rifles.

At a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group in Brussels, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced plans to donate military equipment to Ukraine in 2025. The donation will include four IRIS-T air defense systems, 300 guided missiles, 100 ground surveillance radars, 100,000 artillery rounds, 300 reconnaissance drones, 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Leopard 1A5 tanks, and 120 portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

Speaking to outlet ARD last Sunday, Merz, who is expected to be officially named chancellor on May 6, hinted that he could deliver Taurus missiles to Ukraine. The Taurus has a range of 500km.

Current Chancellor Olaf Scholz has repeatedly turned down Kiev’s requests for the rockets, arguing that they could lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict.

Matthias Miersch, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which is currently in the process of forming a coalition government with Merz’s Christian Democrats, expressed hope on Wednesday that the incoming chancellor, “once fully informed by [intelligence] agencies, will reassess the issue clearly.”

In response to Merz’s remark, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that any cruise missile attack on Russian facilities or critical transport infrastructure requiring Bundeswehr assistance would be seen as direct German involvement in military operations.

Pope Francis has dissolved the conservative Sodalitium Christianae Vitae (SCV), an international Catholic lay community that also includes about a hundred priests. Once again, the actual or perceived failure of individuals in the intra-Church directional conflict provided the lever for the welcome dismantling of the opposing side on a completely different level. The dissolution of the Sodalitium cannot be understood without considering the open properties that remain in Latin America.

The dissolution was announced yesterday by the Vatican Press Office and also disseminated by the secular media with obvious satisfaction. The reason given was the failure of the founder, who is accused of severe sexual abuse, although no formal proceedings, let alone a conviction, have taken place in any secular or ecclesiastical court.

What is being concealed: The dissolution decisively resolved a decades-long power struggle in the Church in Latin America, as the Sodalitium represented a counter-movement to Marxist liberation theology.

The Vatican Press Office published the decree of the Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life, which, however, bears no date, leading to initial assumptions that it was dated yesterday. In fact, the dissolution had already taken place on March 29th, a few days after Francis' return from the Gemelli Clinic to the Vatican. This was announced yesterday by the Sodalitium itself.

The dissolution followed years of investigations involving serious abuse allegations against the founder, as well as alleged financial irregularities within the community. The wording of the statement released yesterday is as follows:

"Upon conclusion of an investigation ordered by Pope Francis on July 5, 2023, to verify the validity of the accusations of various responsibilities attributed to Mr. Luis Fernando Figari and numerous other members of the Sodalitium Christianae Vitae, it was decided to dissolve the Societies of Apostolic Life of the Sodalitium Christianae Vitae and the Marian Fraternity of Reconciliation, as well as the Associations of the Faithful of the Handmaids of the Plan of God and the Movement of Christian Life.

The corresponding decrees of dissolution, issued by the Dicastery for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life and expressly confirmed by the Holy Father, have recently been notified."

The SCV was founded in Peru in 1971 as a movement for spiritual renewal within the Catholic Church. It developed into an international community with a broad global presence. Over the years, however, increasing concern grew regarding the internal practices of the community. At least, that is the generally vague portrayal.

In reality, the matter goes deeper, with two levels to be distinguished: the Sodalitium and its significance for the Church in Latin America, and the personal actions of its founder.

The Background

Let's take a step back. During the Cold War, Latin America became an ideological and geopolitical battleground between the two power blocs. The Soviet Union at that time sought to lead the decolonization movement and thereby expand its influence. This was particularly true for Africa and Asia. In Latin America, while not the primary focus, communist propaganda attempted to introduce such elements, but the main issues were stark social disparities and, in particular, a major adversary, the USA, which, since the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, claimed the entire American continent as its sphere of interest and exercised dominance there.

Thus, political forces that had sympathized with European fascism or even National Socialism before 1945, primarily as a chance to break free from US encirclement, switched to the communist side after 1945, as the Soviet Union alone seemed a promising counterplayer to the USA. This phenomenon also occurred within the Catholic Church. A particularly well-known example of this shift is the Brazilian Archbishop Hélder Câmara, but Pope Francis himself, albeit in the wake of a lingering movement, is personally involved through his sympathies for Peronism.

Within the Church, against the backdrop of these political and social conflicts, Marxist-influenced liberation theology emerged, aiming to unite Christianity and socialism. Peru was a core region: There, in 1971, the Dominican Gustavo Gutierrez gave the movement, which had been active since the early 1960s, its powerful name: Liberation Theology.

In the same year, also in Peru, Luis Fernando Figari, a layman strongly motivated by personal faith, founded the Sodalitium Christianae Vitae (SCV), which, in contrast to the Marxist liberation theologians, sought to provide less a political but more a religious response. Social and political answers had to arise from personal conversion, the conviction held, which is why everyone had to start with themselves.

Peru had been ruled since a military coup in 1968 by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. As the leader of the Peruvian Revolution, he pursued a decidedly left-wing course. Velasco took a critical stance against the USA and sought closer ties with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In his numerous fundamental reforms, Velasco was supported by liberation theologians. The Church in Peru was deeply divided by the overall developments.

The founding of the SCV, like Opus Dei, met the needs of many Catholics aligned with the traditional order. Thus, the SCV was not only a movement of spiritual renewal but, from the beginning, if not directly, a counter-movement to liberation theology.

While liberation theology found great and often favorable media support in Western Europe, the SCV remained largely unnoticed for a long time but was perceived in Latin America as a conservative bulwark against leftist subversion of the Church – by both sides.

The conservative orientation in Catholic doctrine, the emphasis on the hierarchical structure within the Sodalitium, the recognition of ecclesiastical authority, the strong spiritual focus, the rejection of leftist ideologies and revolutionary aspirations, and the defense of Catholic identity made the SCV one of several conservative magnets in Latin America. Thus, the Sodalitium became a Catholic reference point and attracted numerous young men seeking a clear Catholic identity in contrast to the spreading progressive tendencies in the Church. The SCV maintained schools in several countries and had direct influence on at least one university founded by it in Peru. In 2002, Figari was appointed Consultor of the Pontifical Council for the Laity by Pope John Paul II.

With the election of Pope Francis, liberation theology circles in Latin America saw the opportunity to decide the decades-long power struggles in their favor. This primarily included the suppression or complete elimination of disliked communities, such as Opus Dei, the SCV, the Instituto del Verbo Encarnado, and the Heralds of the Gospel, to name a few.

Pope Francis himself comes from Latin America and is very familiar with the conditions there. Above all, he supports the fight against markedly conservative communities out of his own conviction.

The Scandal and the Dismantling

Around 2010, internal allegations of psychological and homosexual abuse by Figari against young men of the Sodalitium reportedly became known. Publicly, this happened only several years later. Figari continues to deny the allegations. In 2010, at the age of 70, he resigned from the leadership of the SCV, of which he had been the Superior General since 1971. Outwardly, the resignation was presented as a voluntary withdrawal; internally, it is said, there was pressure due to unspecified allegations. Thus, his figure remained untouched within the community for the time being. He no longer had formal influence but continued to enjoy great respect and thus informal influence over the community's houses.

In 2011, the General Chapter elected the former Vicar General Eduardo Regal Villa as the new Superior General. Like his predecessor, Regal is also a layman. Although the SCV also includes priests, it is fundamentally a lay movement, which is why the leadership of the community was also in lay hands. During Regal's tenure, the abuse allegations against Figari intensified and likely led to Regal's resignation.

In 2012, Alessandro Moroni Llabrés was elected as the new Superior General.

In 2015, the book "Mitad monjes, mitad soldados" ("Half Monks, Half Soldiers") by former SCV member Pedro Salinas, in collaboration with a Peruvian journalist, was published. He accused Figari of psychological violence during his time as Superior General and claimed, albeit vaguely, to have been a victim of psychological and physical abuse himself in the 1980s. He reported homosexual abuse, which he accused Figari and some others of, from hearsay.

The Peruvian Public Prosecutor's Office initiated preliminary investigations, which were archived in 2017 because they were substantially insufficient or already time-barred, but above all because no victims came forward. Subsequently, five alleged victims filed a criminal complaint for forming a criminal association and kidnapping, which is why another prosecutor reopened the investigation in 2018 amid polemics against his colleague who had archived the case. The politicized media accompaniment apparently played the largest role, suggesting that there was a cover-up even in the judiciary. However, the new investigations, despite being pursued for eight years, also had to be archived without result in 2024.

Pope Francis, however, had initiated ecclesiastical investigations in parallel in 2015.

In 2015, Pope Francis sent Bishop Fortunato Pablo Urcey, Prelate of Chota in Peru, as Apostolic Visitor.

In 2016, the Sodalitium declared that an internal investigation had confirmed the allegation of sexual abuse and that Figari was therefore declared persona non grata. Based on the visitation report, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith imposed sanctions on Figari for sexual abuse, psychological abuse, and unethical behavior. Figari emphasized his innocence and spoke of a campaign to discredit his person and the Sodalitium.

In 2017, the SCV leadership declared that it accepted the Roman judgment and that Figari was no longer a member of the Sodalitium, as he had lost all rights and duties as a member. Based on the aforementioned conviction, the Roman Congregation for Religious imposed a series of penalties on Figari: he was expelled from the community, he had to lead a life of penance and seclusion in an assigned place (Rome); he was no longer allowed to return to Peru and he was not allowed to have contact with the community. Figari complied with the measures.

In 2018, Pope Francis sent Msgr. Noel Londoño, Bishop of Jericó in Colombia, as Papal Commissioner with full powers to lead, supervise, and reform the SCV, although the community's leadership formally remained in office, but the final decision on all matters rested with Londoño. Figari's appeals against the Roman measures were rejected.

In 2019, a new Superior General was elected: José David Correa González took office.

In 2022, the homo-activist and Pope's friend Juan Carlos Cruz, inexplicably a member of the Pontifical Commission for the Protection of Minors, demanded the dissolution of the Sodalitium. This move fueled doubts about the motives of the papal actions in the SCV case.

In 2024, the Vatican expelled ten members from the SCV. Some were accused of abuse of various kinds, especially psychological. Mainly, the Vatican decision stated, the individuals had contributed to maintaining Figari's "system" and its cover-up. Figari himself was also expelled, as, according to the justification, there had been no formally legally valid expulsion decree until then. Emeritus Archbishop José Antonio Eguren of Piura was also expelled. No guilt is discernible in the case of other expelled individuals. The accusation that they had "endangered the credibility and integrity of the Church" is very broadly worded. The fact is that there were efforts to save the SCV, not least to prevent the ecclesiastical balance from tilting further to the left. An appeal against the expulsions was prohibited by Francis.

In 2025, the Sodalitium and all affiliated associations were dissolved.

Necessity or Revenge?

Figari had resigned in 2010, his influence had been minimal since 2012 and non-existent since 2016. He has not been in the community for almost ten years. Therefore, the question arises whether the dismantling of the Sodalitium is really a necessary and appropriate measure. The repression applied since 2015 is seen by secular and ecclesiastical media as a "turning point in the Church's handling of internal abuse scandals" and demonstrates "the Vatican's willingness to hold even influential members accountable." However, this interpretation is precisely where the reading falters. The fact is that under Francis, a strict selection takes place in the fight against abuse: abuse is actively and unilaterally fought, then all the more loudly, when it can be used to eliminate conservative intra-Church opponents. Were revenge thoughts ultimately the real driving force behind the Roman interventions against the SCV?

The purge that Francis has carried out in Latin America is considerable. A look at the four conservative communities mentioned above paints a clear picture. Opus Dei was made compliant through some targeted measures (withdrawal of the legal status for the Work of God and the episcopal dignity of the Superior General) and massively weakened in Peru by the retirement of Cardinal Cipriani Thorne; the Sodalitium Christianae Vitae was dissolved, and the Instituto del Verbo Encarnado and the Heralds of the Gospel were placed under Apostolic Commissars. The accusations that were taken as the occasion (or pretext?) vary greatly. What these communities have in common, however, is that there are old, open scores to settle and that they stand in the way of the Bergoglian agenda.

Since 2024, the Vatican has prohibited the Sodalitium from holding its planned General Chapter and conducting new elections. Thus, Correa remained in office as Superior General until the canonical dissolution, but was under the constant supervision of the papal commissar, who was somewhat euphemistically called a delegate. Since the appointment of the commissar , no significant decisions could be made in the SCV without Vatican approval.

Summary

In the long shadows of the ecclesiastical directional conflict, the Sodalitium Christianae Vitae was an uncomfortable thorn for many – conservative, loyal to the Pope, committed to doctrine, hierarchical. For the representatives of a progressive theology, not least in the circle of Pope Francis, it was a thorn in their side. The lever for an open dismantling was apparently provided by one of their own: Luis Fernando Figari, founder and charismatic leader. His alleged moral failure ultimately became the target that had been sought for years and, through the election of Francis, could be used against the SCV from above with the full papal authority. Thus, the alleged misconduct of the individual became a triumph of the opposing side over an entire community – not through persuasive power, but through the weakness of the opponent. The conservative side did not fall behind due to a loss of arguments, but due to actual and alleged personal failure.

Text: Giuseppe Nardi

Image: SCV/VaticanMedia/MiL (Screenshots)

Trans: Tancred vekron99@hotmail.com

AMDG