A new survey of 1,000 first-time homebuyers reveals the complex and often stressful reality of entering the housing market. Rising housing prices, high interest rates, and market uncertainty have created a tough environment for newcomers, many of whom must stretch their budgets or make lifestyle compromises just to get a foot in the door, according to a new survey from Raleigh Realty. 

The survey shows a clear generational divide in homeownership. The majority of first-time buyers are Gen X or Baby Boomers, while only 4% are Gen Z. For younger adults, especially Gen Z, the barriers to entry remain high. Those who do purchase tend to be higher earners—63% of Gen Z buyers make more than $75,000 annually. In contrast, many Baby Boomers bought their first homes with more modest incomes, suggesting that affordability has deteriorated over time.

Income still plays a central role in homeownership access. While many first-time buyers earn between $50,000 and $75,000, a significant portion earn less, especially among older generations. Gen Z stands out again here, with relatively few buyers earning below $50,000. This trend reflects broader concerns among younger people about financial stability, shaped by growing up during the 2008 housing crash and entering adulthood amid pandemic-era economic turmoil.

Flexible work has had a strong impact on home buying decisions. A third of first-time buyers work remotely or in hybrid roles, and this flexibility often enables them to relocate in search of more affordable housing or better quality of life. Gen Z leads in remote work adoption, with more than 40% working fully in-office, while Baby Boomers represent the largest group not in traditional employment, instead relying on retirement income or alternative sources.

Despite media narratives about falling housing prices, very few first-time buyers made purchases in the last year. Most bought their homes three to four years ago, during or shortly after the pandemic housing surge. The steep drop in 2023 home sales reflects wider economic conditions, including high inflation and reduced affordability.

Single-family homes remain the overwhelming favorite among first-time buyers, with 90% choosing this option regardless of income. Even those earning less than $50,000 opted for standalone houses over condos or multi-family units. However, most chose existing homes rather than new construction, likely due to cost or availability.

For many, the journey into homeownership was taken solo or as a couple. Half of respondents were married, while 40% were single. Only a small percentage bought homes with friends, siblings, or unmarried partners. These results reflect traditional patterns of household formation and financial independence.

Most buyers moved quickly once they started looking for a home. About 70% closed within six months, and 35% found a home in three months or less. But speed didn’t reduce stress—90% of first-time buyers found the process difficult. The top source of stress was affordability, which overwhelmed concerns about mortgage approval, taxes, or maintenance.

Financial strain led many buyers to make compromises. Nearly one in five settled for smaller homes, less desirable locations, or properties needing repairs. Stretching the budget was another common trade-off. Baby Boomers were most willing to go over budget, while Gen Z was most likely to compromise on location.

Concerns about job stability were widespread. More than half of buyers worried they wouldn't be able to make mortgage payments if they lost their job, with the highest anxiety levels among Gen Z and Millennials. Baby Boomers, by contrast, were more confident in their financial resilience, likely due to retirement savings or paid-off homes.

Contrary to popular belief, most first-time buyers didn’t receive financial help. About 73% paid for their homes without family assistance. Among those who did receive help, contributions varied, with 52% getting $10,000 or less. Just 16% received over $20,000, and only a small share received help from government programs.

The Raleigh Realty report says that even though mortgage approval is a common concern, most buyers didn’t apply for financing until after they began house hunting. Over half only applied to one lender. The majority selected lenders based on interest rates, while others went with banks they already used or those recommended by real estate agents.

Despite all these financial concerns, most buyers reported feeling satisfied after purchasing. While only 12% said they bought their dream home, 73% felt that homeownership brought them closer to the American dream. Lower-income buyers tended to report the highest satisfaction, possibly because expectations were more modest.

Few first-time buyers plan to move soon. Only 9% expect to sell their homes within five years, while nearly half intend to stay for at least a decade. A long-term mindset seems to dominate, with 30% planning to remain for 20 years or more.

Home improvement is a common post-purchase goal. Around 60% of buyers expect to invest $1,000 to $10,000 in upgrades during the first year, and nearly one in three plan to spend even more. These projects are seen as essential for adding value or addressing compromises made during the purchase process.

Younger buyers are also more likely to explore income-generating strategies. Around 40% of Gen Z and 30% of Millennials have taken on a second job to manage homeownership costs. Many also rent out parts of their property or use short-term rental platforms. In contrast, only 14% of Baby Boomers supplement their income in this way.

Emergency savings are more common among first-time buyers than the general population. Around 79% reported having some form of savings, with most holding over $1,000 and 17% saving more than $20,000. Younger buyers may be more motivated to save due to fears about job loss or economic instability.

In summary the full survey results show that while homeownership is still viewed as an important milestone, today’s first-time buyers are navigating a complex and stressful landscape. Income, generational experience, and work flexibility all influence outcomes, and most buyers are willing to make sacrifices to achieve the goal of owning a home.

Submitted by Thomas Kolbe,

The European Central Bank (ECB) is pushing ahead with the “Digital Euro” project. On a new interaction platform, it is seeking dialogue with banks, startups, fintechs, and retailers. What is being sold as an open discourse is, in truth, calculated camouflage.

While the economic policy debate has shifted to the trade conflict with the US, things have gone quiet around the digital euro (CBDC). Yet, the ECB recently launched an online interaction platform where merchants and payment service providers can express their opinions about the new payment system. About 70 pre-selected market participants are to test the “ecosystem” of the digital euro in real-world applications and identify problems. The platform enables the testing of new payment services, such as conditional payments or the integration of digital wallets in post offices. Proponents of the project aim to modernize the payment system, granting access to the financial system even to those currently excluded due to their economic situation.

However, this mainly applies to people in poorer regions of the world-here, the benefit of a digital payment infrastructure, as offered by stablecoins (usually denominated in US dollars), is obvious. The question is whether we should consider something like this for the eurozone. Does the Chinese model of the digital yuan really align with our values, which should balance utility, efficiency, security, and individual sovereignty?

What is the Digital Euro?

The digital euro would be a small revolution, leading to a fully centralized form of central bank money. In tokenized form, it could be technically programmed and controlled-each monetary unit could be assigned conditions, each transaction centrally managed. The ECB would then be the sole issuer and operator of central wallets and the entire account infrastructure.

This raises questions about the future of commercial banks. At best, they could only function as distribution channels-their traditional role as intermediaries in payment transactions would effectively disappear. Lending would then fall into the hands of a largely autonomous central entity, which, needless to say, would be synchronized with the European Union’s objectives. According to its own statements, the ECB aims to develop the digital euro as a “secure, free-of-charge, and privacy-friendly means of payment” that, as is claimed in Frankfurt, is only intended to supplement the use of cash.

Such assurances from the ECB are nothing new, and so the launch of the interaction platform should be interpreted as a media charm offensive-or better: as a kind of transparency simulation that distracts from the real problems of this technology. Participants are pre-selected service providers whose expertise is indispensable for system design and procedural processes. Direct attacks on the monetary sovereignty of individuals or the separation of state and monetary system are not addressed on the platform. A public vote on the future of cash in the eurozone seems more unlikely than ever.

The Current State

Since November 2023, the European Central Bank has been in a two-year preparatory phase. By October or November of this year, technical foundations, data protection requirements, and initial tests are to be completed. The recently launched interaction platform, where citizens, merchants, and payment service providers can participate, is part of this process. Technically, the ECB is clearly oriented towards existing stablecoin models, where transactions are fast, secure, and free of charge. ECB President Christine Lagarde had already suggested in March that the digital euro could be introduced as early as October 2025.

But as so often with large-scale EU projects, this timeline seems overambitious and born out of haste. The challenge lies not only in technical complexity-billions of transactions are processed daily via existing systems-but also in the sensitive interplay between the central bank, commercial banks, retailers, and consumers. The overhaul is like trying to move a monolith by hand: massive, sluggish, risky.

Furthermore, the security architecture of the digital euro remains largely in the dark. Given the real threat of targeted attacks from the international hacker scene, this reticence is remarkable-real dangers, as well as fundamental systemic criticism, are ignored.

The Leviathan-Thoughts on the Background of CBDC

The digital euro is not a neutral means of payment. It is a tool of power. The ECB is no longer positioning itself merely as a central bank but as the central technological infrastructure operator for payments in Europe. For the first time, it would have direct access to the entire monetary infrastructure of the eurozone-from payment flows to account management and even to the potential control of individual monetary units. The digital euro would give the ECB not only more insight into financial activity but also far-reaching intervention and control possibilities over the financial system-with significant political and social implications.

As a largely autonomous entity, the European Central Bank has evaded democratic control since its inception. Even during the last sovereign debt crisis 15 years ago, it managed to massively expand its real-world powers by buying up government bonds on a large scale and thus effectively beginning to monetize government debt. The planned introduction of a digital euro would further cement this immediate power-with potentially profound consequences for the balance between monetary sovereignty, fiscal responsibility, and democratic legitimacy.

Why the Rush?

Against this backdrop, a central question arises: Why is the ECB pushing for the introduction of a digital euro right now? The eurozone has been stuck in a structural economic and debt crisis for some time. Germany’s economy, traditionally the EU’s anchor of stability, is in its third year of a persistent recession. At the same time, many southern European countries have long since lost control over their national debt.

Amid this fragile situation, the ECB is increasing the pressure to implement digital central bank money-a step that is not only technocratically motivated but also aims to deeply reshape the architecture of the European financial system. France, with a national debt of 120%, and Italy, with 140%, will not be able to escape the debt spiral without massive monetary interventions-the ECB is firmly planned as the “lender of last resort” in the capitals of the eurozone. Massive credit injections and yield curve control seem to be the only way out of this dilemma. A sovereign default is not an option, as it would mean the end of the entire eurozone.

The Greek crisis is a reminder. However, the mountain of debt in the eurozone has continued to rise to 95%. Bringing it under control in the event of a debt crisis would be much more complicated. The necessary expansion of the credit base to rescue over-indebted states would be so massive that investors would question the stability of the currency. In such a scenario, the digital euro would not be a neutral means of payment but a tool for market closure-with programmable transactions that could nip any capital flight in the bud.

The digital euro thus mutates into an electronic bolt: the ECB raises the drawbridges of the EU fortress to prevent a flight from the system and thus the collapse of the euro.

Consequences and Outlook

What is obviously underestimated in the Frankfurt ECB Tower is the speed at which mobile capital moves today. It is to be expected that the already beginning capital flight from the eurozone will accelerate dramatically-precisely at the moment when rumors spread in European financial centers that the ECB wants to close the gates with the help of a digital euro.

Given the political movement in the United States against CBDCs and the clear rejection of this technology by the Federal Reserve, there is a danger that Europe, especially the eurozone, will isolate itself through the ECB’s initiative. Unlike the United States, which is currently pursuing deregulation and free-market policies, the euro CBDC appears as a digital panopticon: a central authority that monitors everything, controls everything, and reserves the right to intervene at its discretion. An opaque monster that directly threatens the sovereignty of the citizen.

With the digital euro, the ECB is not only planning the creation of a new means of payment. We are witnessing an attempt to radically change the way we handle money. 

What is being touted as a convenient, cashless payment option could turn out to be a Trojan horse for deep control of the financial system and the individual citizen. Unfortunately, the new interaction platform does not offer the opportunity to discuss these thoughts in detail.

Authored by James Durso via OilPrice.com,

• A war between India and Pakistan would significantly destabilize Central Asia, disrupting trade routes, delaying infrastructure projects, and increasing regional militancy.

• China, Russia, and the U.S. may intensify involvement in Central Asia, leveraging the conflict to protect or expand their influence.

• Potential nuclear fallout, refugee flows, and the breakdown of regional cooperation could severely impact Central Asia’s economic development, security, and food systems.

If India and Pakistan spiral into war, there will be consequences for Central Asia.

A war between Pakistan and India would likely have significant ripple effects on Central Asia, given the region's proximity to Afghanistan and flourishing economic ties across the region. The conflict could disrupt trade and energy routes, increase militancy, and draw in major powers like China, Russia, and the U.S., potentially straining Central Asian stability.

Intervention by external powers: The Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan) are already arenas for competition among outside powers. A Pakistan-India conflict could draw these powers into the region more aggressively to secure their interests, though Russia is busy in Ukraine, Turkey is busy in Syria, and U.S. forces are fighting in the Middle East, and Washington is ready to confront China.

China is an ally of Pakistan and sponsor of the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China might deepen its presence in Central Asia to secure trade routes and counterbalance India’s regional influence. This could accelerate Chinese investments in infrastructure and energy projects that will increase trade with the region that totaled $89 billion in 2023, up 27% from 2022, $60 billion of which was Chinese exports.

And China may make further inroads into the Central Asia arms market given Moscow’s need to dedicate all its resources to the Russia-NATO war in Ukraine. This will allow China to broaden its engagement beyond infrastructure projects into the security realm that, up to now, has been limited to anti-terrorism training and intelligence sharing in Tajikistan.

Russia is an ally of India, a buyer of Russian arms, having purchased $60 billion of Russian arms, 65 percent of its total weapons imports, over the past twenty years With its historical ties to Central Asia and shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia might leverage a conflict to reinforce the region’s border security, and increase intelligence sharing and security forces training.

And just in time, Russia has declared it will help the Taliban government fight the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K).

The United States could focus on Central Asia to counter China and Russia, potentially increasing military or economic aid to Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, the major economies in the region. Unlike the leaders of Russia or China, no American president has ever visited Central Asia but President Donald Trump could signal increased U.S. attention by visiting the region.  

Afghanistan as a flashpoint. Afghanistan, bordering both Pakistan and Central Asia, would likely become a hotspot. The Afghan Taliban’s support for the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) could further destabilize Pakistan, presenting Islamabad with the prospect of a two-front war, though recent visits by Pakistan’s diplomats, and military and security officials seeking a “diplomat reboot” may be just in time to stanch action by the TTP.

Instability would come to Central Asia via Afghanistan in the form of refugees and energized militants, and economic stagnation in the delay of development projects like the Trans-Afghan railway, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and the CASA-1000 renewable energy infrastructure construction project.

General disorder may spill insecurity into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where cross-border militancy (e.g., the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, and IS-K could surge.

And the instability will cause a slowdown in foreign direct investment that has steadily climbed as has foreign trade in goods and accession to bilateral investment treaties. The region’s economy suffered “lost decades” between the start of the Afghan civil war in 1992 and the end of the NATO occupation of Afghanistan in 2021 and has been making steady progress in connecting to the wider world economy; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are completing the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process, and Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are WTO members.

And just in time for a war, the World Bank is predicting economic slowdown for Central Asia:   Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will suffer pronounced declines, Kazakhstan’s decline will be less pronounced, and Uzbekistan’s growth rate will remain steady at 5.9%.

The U.S. may try to leverage disorder on Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan to pressure the Kabul government, but that risks empowering Al-Qaeda, IS-K, the hardline Taliban faction in Kandahar, or some combination of the three. Disorder in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, the poorest place in Pakistan, may energize the local separatists and draw in bordering Iran which faces a Baloch insurgence on its side of the border.

India’s Central Asian Ambitions. India’s efforts to access Central Asian and Afghan resources, via Iran’s Chabahar port, could be disrupted, forcing India to seek alternative routes or deepen ties with Russia and Iran, affecting regional alignments, and angering the U.S. which is trying to isolate Moscow and Tehran.

India imports uranium for its nuclear power program from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and an uninterrupted supply by the republics will be a sign to India they value their relationship with Delhi.  

Trade Route Disruptions: Central Asia relies on connectivity projects like CPEC and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). A war could disrupt CPEC which links China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar port and passes through contested areas like Kashmir. India’s trade routes to Central Asia via Iran and Afghanistan could be jeopardized if conflict escalates or Afghanistan becomes unstable, though if Indian merchantmen are unmolested by Pakistan the impact may be minimized and they will be able to safely dock at Iranian ports.

Tightened border controls will hurt regional trade that was boosted by eased border controls that teased the possibility of a unified regional market, following the resolution of many territorial disputes, a process that began in earnest after the 2016 election of Uzbekistan’s president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

The Central Asia republics trade with India and Pakistan and will be reluctant to be drawn into one side’s economic warfare on the other. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the three largest economies in the region, all import packaged medicaments and vaccines from India and mostly food products from Pakistan, and may find it easier to replace the lower-valued agriculture products than disrupting their medical supply chain.

Pakistan and Kazakhstan recently inked a transit trade agreement that would see goods shipped from Central Asia through the Pakistani ports of Karachi, Bin Qasim, and Gwadar, and the start of direct flights between the countries. An India-Pakistan war will bring in the insurance companies who may cancel coverage to aircraft, trucks, and their cargoes, delaying the benefits of the deal.

Spillover of Militancy: A Pakistan-India war, especially if centered on Kashmir, could embolden extremist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have historical ties to Afghan and Pakistani militants. 

This could inspire increased terrorist activity in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where groups like the IMU and IS-K could exploit regional conflict for recruitment and radicalization.

Nuclear Risks: Both nations possess nuclear arsenals, less than 200 weapons each. Even a limited nuclear exchange could cause dire environmental and climatic effects, disrupting Central Asian agriculture and food security, and pretty much eliminating agriculture exports as customers fret about “contamination,” despite the prevailing westerly winds. In Uzbekistan, agriculture contributes about 25% to the Gross Domestic Product and employs about a quarter of the workforce, so the economic (and political) impact would be profound.

Conflict in Pakistan or Afghanistan could drive refugees into Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan, straining resources and sparking ethnic tensions, and destabilizing resource-strapped governments.

India and Pakistan are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as are several Central Asian states, and China and Russia. A war could paralyze SCO initiatives, hindering regional security and economic cooperation. Tensions might also exacerbate India-China rivalries within the SCO, affecting Central Asia’s balancing act.

Specific Impacts on Central Asian States

Tajikistan shares a porous border with Afghanistan, making it vulnerable to militancy and refugee inflows. India’s military training programs with Tajikistan could be disrupted, and its newly-refurbished (by India) Ayni Airbase base may worry Pakistan.) As a regional leader, Uzbekistan might seek to strengthen ties with Russia and China to counter instability, however, its trade with South Asia could suffer. Neutral but energy-dependent, Turkmenistan could benefit from Chinese energy demand. As the major Central Asia economy, Kazakhstan might leverage its SCO and Eurasian Economic Union ties to mitigate disruptions but could face energy market volatility. Kyrgyzstan is economically fragile and be hit hard by trade disruptions increasing reliance on China or Russia.

Long-Term Implications

Regional Polarization: Central Asia could become more divided, with some states aligning with China (e.g., Turkmenistan) and others with Russia or the West (e.g., Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan), hindering regional unity, which may be in the interests of Washington, Beijing, Brussels, or Moscow.

Securitization: Fear of spillover could lead Central Asian states to increase security spending, diverting resources from economic development. More than half of Central Asia’s population is under 30 years of age and they have high expectations that governments are trying to satisfy by increasing educational and economic opportunity, and diversifying the economies away from agriculture and natural resource extraction, and towards technology, services, and tourism. And more security may come at the expense of civil rights.

Environmental Fallout: A nuclear conflict, even limited, could cause global climate disruptions, devastating Central Asia’s agriculture-dependent economies.

Conclusion

India has been active in Central Asia with its Connect Central Asia Policy, which aims to enhance trade, connectivity, and diplomatic engagement, and hinges on India’s development of Chabahar port in Iran, though the Trump administration rescinded the sanctions waiver on Chabahar. Washington’s fixation on Iran, specifically ruining its economy to press it for a favorable nuclear deal, may see India and Central Asia as collateral damage.

The republics import higher value goods from India (Packaged Medicaments) than they do from Pakistan (food products), and sell uranium – a strategic good – to India. India has a larger market than Pakistan and is a provider of technology products that Pakistan cannot match, and the republics’ future is with India, though they have no reason to antagonize Islamabad.

A Pakistan-India war would destabilize Central Asia by disrupting trade, fueling militancy, and intensifying great power rivalries. The region’s proximity to Afghanistan and reliance on connectivity projects make it particularly vulnerable. Central Asian states would face economic strain, security threats, and pressure to align with external powers, potentially fracturing regional cooperation. The nuclear risk underscores the catastrophic potential, with global climatic effects threatening Central Asia’s food security and economic stability. To mitigate these risks, Central Asian states might pursue neutrality, strengthen SCO ties, or seek mediation roles, but their limited clout may constrain effective responses.

Authored by Jackson Richman via The Epoch Times,

A House Intelligence Committee report released on May 6 says that the FBI mishandled its investigation of the 2017 shooting at a GOP practice one day before the annual Congressional Baseball Game—including not calling the incident domestic terrorism and not interviewing key figures.

The committee’s chairman, Rick Crawford (R-Ark.), accused the FBI of holding up the report.

“There’s no reasonable or acceptable explanation for why the FBI stonewalled the committee for so long,” he said during a press conference.

“In fact, it’s taken so long to get this case file, many of those members at the field on that fateful day are no longer in Congress.”

The report found that the FBI did not thoroughly interview victims and eyewitnesses to the shooting, where House Majority Leader Steve Scalise (R-La.) and four others were shot.

Scalise was shot in the hip and seriously wounded, requiring several surgeries and a lengthy recovery.

Former Rep. Mo Brooks (R-Ala.) was not interviewed despite being at the scene during the shooting.

The shooter, James Hodgkinson, was shot and killed by Capitol Police, who were already on the scene due to Scalise’s presence as he was a member of House GOP leadership and therefore afforded a security detail.

The report also found that the bureau did not come up with a timeline of events surrounding the shooting.

The report attempted to dispute the FBI’s claim that the shooting was not connected to domestic terrorism.

In a press release following the shooting, the FBI said it “does not believe there is a nexus to terrorism.”

The Intelligence Committee report criticized the press release, saying it failed to include information that would have contradicted what the report called the FBI’s “suicide by cop” narrative.

“To commit suicide by cop, the perpetrator needs to demonstrate hostile intent in the presence of police. In this case, there were no observable police officers present,” the report said, noting that the officers were dressed in plain clothes.

The report said that the FBI’s “conclusions failed to follow the facts, as it reached an unsupported conclusion without completing even the most basic of investigative activities.”

The report said that while the FBI cited that Hodgkinson’s brother believed that the aim of the shooting was for Hodgkinson to die by suicide by cop, this was merely the brother’s opinion and not based on any communications.

Scalise was made aware of the report by the committee, according to Crawford, who declined to elaborate as he did not want to speak on Scalise’s behalf.

In a statement to The Epoch Times, the FBI said it “is committed to working quickly and transparently with Capitol Hill to ensure the American people receive the full truth they deserve.”

“We have diligently delivered all requested documents and will continue to cooperate fully with Congress to uphold transparency and accountability,” the bureau said.