This year, we celebrate Divine Mercy Sunday just one day after Pope Francis is laid to rest.

Pope Francis taught that mercy is essential for Christian life and happiness. He insisted that mercy is not just a theological concept, but the lived experience of God’s closeness to us.

It is said that Pope Francis truly placed the theme of mercy at the heart of his papacy.

Through Saint Faustina, Our Lord gifted humanity with several channels to access the timeless message and incredible graces found in His Mercy.

Below are the five forms of devotion to Divine Mercy and a few bonus facts!

7 Things to Know About Divine Mercy

1) THE DIARY OF SAINT FAUSTINA

Jesus appeared to a poor Polish nun, Saint Maria Faustina Kowalska, and charged her with spreading His message of Mercy to the world.

Her more than 600 diary pages hold the message and devotion to Jesus as The Divine Mercy. The release of her diary sparked a movement that led to the spreading of the official image and devotion.

Note from Author: I will reference excerpts from the diary numerous times in this article. You can purchase your own copy on the EWTN Religious Catalogue.

2) THE DIVINE MERCY MESSAGE

The Lord’s Mercy is greater than our sins, and He desires for us to turn to Him with trust and repentance before our judgment.

The message of Divine Mercy is not new to Church teaching. Pope Benedict XVI described it as the center of the Gospel.

3) THE DIVINE MERCY IMAGE

The image was the first element of devotion revealed by Jesus on Feb. 22, 1931, and referred to as a vessel of grace!

Jesus said to Saint Faustina:

*Remember, the physical image itself is not to be worshiped! It’s a vessel/reminder of the source and reality of this image.

4) THE DIVINE MERCY CHAPLET

The Chaplet of Divine Mercy was given to Saint Faustina in 1935 during a private revelation.

It is a powerful way to meditate upon His Passion and is prayed using ordinary Rosary beads (five decades). You can find a full how-to guide here.

Jesus revealed promises attached to praying the Divine Mercy Chaplet.

5) THE HOUR OF MERCY

The hour of mercy starts at three o’clock, which is the hour Jesus died on the Cross.

Jesus explained to Saint Faustina:

6) THE FEAST OF THE DIVINE MERCY

Jesus requested the solemn celebration to be the first Sunday after Easter:

It was Saint Pope John Paul II who officially established Divine Mercy Sunday as a feast day for the entire Church.

You can find details on receiving a plenary indulgence on Divine Mercy Sunday here.

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The Divine Mercy Novena begins on Good Friday, nine days before Divine Mercy Sunday.

The Lord said:

In giving us the Divine Mercy novena, Jesus also provided us with special intentions for each day:

The full instructions can be found here and in the Diary of Saint Faustina (1210-1229).

How are you celebrating Divine Mercy Sunday?

Francis in Full(press for full article)

Bishop Robert Barron became quite frank about Pope Francis' papacy. He begins his critique with listing the great things Pope Francis accomplished, especially being a pastoral pope and a pope of the streets with the language of the streets.

But then he turns to what needs to be refined and reset:

And yet, what one reads in almost every assessment of the late pope is that he was, at the very least, “controversial,” “confusing,” “ambiguous.” Some commentators would go so far as to say that he was heretical, undermining the ancient traditions of the Church. I do not at all subscribe to that latter position, but I sympathize to a degree with the former characterizations. Pope Francis was a puzzling figure in many ways, seeming to delight in confounding expectations, zigging when you thought he would zag. He famously told the young people gathered for World Youth Day in Rio de Janeiro to “hagan lío” (make a mess), and sometimes he appeared to take pleasure in doing just that. 

One of the messier moments of the Francis pontificate was the two-part Synod on the Family, which took place in 2014 and 2015. The fact that Walter Cardinal Kasper, a long-time advocate of allowing divorced and remarried Catholics to receive communion, spoke at the outset of the gathering indicated rather clearly the direction that Pope Francis wanted the synod to take. But he was met with stiff resistance from bishops, especially from the developing world, and when the final document appeared, the famous Amoris Laetitia, the question seemed oddly unresolved, open to a variety of interpretations. When the pope’s apologists pointed to an obscure footnote buried deep in the document as providing the requisite clarity, many in the Church were, to say the least, incredulous. And when four cardinals petitioned the pope to resolve a number of puzzles (dubia­, in the technical jargon) that Amoris Laetitia had raised in their minds, they were basically ignored. 

There are indeed many beautiful insights in Amoris Laetitia, but they were largely overlooked due to the controversy and ambiguity that accompanied the document. Indeed, in the wake of its publication, a sort of “doctrinal anarchy” was let loose, as various bishops’ conferences gave the document varying interpretations, so that, for example, what remained a mortal sin in Poland seemed permissible in Malta. If a primary responsibility of the pope is to maintain unity in doctrine and morals, it is hard to see how Pope Francis met that obligation throughout that synodal process and its aftermath. 

And he oddly did not seem to learn from this situation. In 2023, after the first round of the Synod on Synodality (more on this anon), Pope Francis’s doctrinal chief, Victor Manuel Cardinal Fernández, issued the statement Fiducia Supplicans, which allowed for the possibility of blessing those in same-sex unions. To say that a firestorm broke out in the Catholic world would be an understatement, and the opposition was led, once again, by Catholic leaders from the non-Western sphere. In an astonishing display of unity and courage, the bishops of Africa said that they would not enforce the teaching of Fiducia in their countries, and the pope backed down, permitting them to dissent from the document. That all of this unfolded immediately after a gathering of four hundred leaders from around the Catholic world, who were never consulted on the matter, simply beggars belief. Once again, the pope struggled to maintain the unity of the Church.

At times, too, the pope’s admirably generous instincts appeared to lead him into saying doctrinally imprecise things or countenancing problematic behaviors. An example of the first would be his endorsement, on a number of occasions, of the proposition that all religions are legitimate paths to God, like differing languages speaking the same truth. Now, given his clear enthusiasm for evangelization, I want to be generous in my interpretation of his words, construing them perhaps along the lines of the Second Vatican Council’s assertion that there are elements of truth in all religions. But I think it is fair to say that the pope at least gave the strong impression of religious indifferentism.  

As an example of his countenancing of problematic behaviors, I would point to the (in)famous Pachamama incident at the Synod on the Amazon in 2019. Though there remains a good deal of confusion about the purpose of the placement of the Pachamama statue in the Vatican Gardens during a prayer with the pope, it is certainly fair to say that it generated much controversy and that the various attempts to explain it only made matters worse. Once more, the pope found himself in the middle of a self-created and completely unnecessary kerfuffle, the man supposed to guarantee unity at least implicitly undermining it.

No one doubts that Pope Francis was rhetorically gifted, not in the academic manner of John Paul II or Benedict XVI to be sure, but in the manner of a parish priest adept at popular homilizing. And his speech very often had an edge. Here are a few of his gems: “Mr. and Mrs. Whiner”; “liquid Christian”; “pickled-pepper-faced Christian”; “weak to the point of rottenness”; “Church who is more spinster than mother.” And I believe it is fair to say that his rhetorical venom was, more often than not, directed at conservative Catholics. Here are a few more zingers: “the closed, legalistic slave of his own rigidity”; “doctors of the letter!”; “Rigidity conceals the leading of a double life, something pathological”; “professionals of the sacred! Reactionaries”; and, most famously, “­backwardists.” 

I know that these withering criticisms often deeply discouraged orthodox Catholics, especially young priests and seminarians, whom the pope once referred to as “little monsters.” On one occasion, during the first session of the Synod on Synodality, the pope spoke to the assembled delegates. This sort of direct papal intervention was extremely rare, for, to his credit, the pope did not want excessively to sway or dominate the discussion. He spoke, in a sarcastic tone, of young clerics in Rome who spend too much time at the clerical haberdashery shops, trying on hats, collars, and cassocks. Now, there may indeed be some immature priests and students who are preoccupied with such things, but it struck me as exceedingly strange that this was the topic the pope chose for this rare opportunity to address some of the top leadership of the Church. 

To me, it indicated a curious fixation on, and demonization of, the more conservatively minded. And what made matters even more mystifying is that Francis had to have known that the Church is flourishing precisely among its more conservative members. As the famously liberal church of Germany withers on the vine, the conservative, supernaturally-­oriented church of Nigeria is exploding in numbers. And in the West, the lively parts of the Church are, without doubt, those that embrace a vibrant orthodoxy rather than those that accommodate the secularist culture. Many of the pope’s expressions and stories were indeed funny, but one would be hard pressed to characterize them as invitations to dialogue with conservative interlocutors. 

By way of conclusion, I would like to say a few words about synodality, which I believe Francis himself would identify as his signature theme. I was privileged to be an elected delegate to both sessions of the Synod on Synodality. For two months, I listened to and spoke with representatives from all over the world, and I learned a lot about how Catholics respond to challenges in remarkably diverse cultural milieux. I very much enjoyed the conversations, both those formal exchanges around the table, and even more so, the informal chats during coffee breaks. I came to understand the pope’s Jesuit-inspired process of prayerful discernment. 

I also came, I must admit, to appreciate the limits of synodality. Though every dialogue was lively and informative, very few of them moved toward decision, judgment, or resolution. Most were stuck at what Bernard Lonergan would call the second stage of the epistemic process, namely, being intelligent or having bright ideas. They didn’t move to Lonergan’s third level, which is the act of making a judgment, much less to his fourth stage, which is that of responsible action. So respectful were we of the “process” of conversation that we had almost a phobia of coming to decision. 

This is a fatal problem for Christians entrusted with the evangelical command to announce Christ to the world. The upshot is something that I believe is repugnant to what Pope Francis has consistently said he wants the Church to be: extroverted, mission-oriented, not stuck in the sacristy. I wondered at times during the two rounds of the synod whether synodality represented a tension within the mind and heart of Francis himself. 

Of all of the popes in my lifetime, Francis is, by far, the one I knew the best. I was with him for three Octobers: the two already mentioned, and a third for the Synod on Young People in 2018. During those wonderful months, I saw him practically every day and had a few occasions to speak to him. I also encountered him on an ad limina visit and at a handful of other audiences. I always found him gracious, funny, and approachable; once we had a short but intense spiritual conversation. I considered him my spiritual father and sincerely mourn his passing. Requiescat in pace.

A Peace Deal or a Deception

Is Putin Again Being Deceived, or Are Putin and Trump Deceiving Their Own Populations?

Paul Craig Roberts

The details of the peace deal presented  by US special envoy Steve Witkoff are consistent with the report in the Financial Times discussed in my previous article and with Larry Sparano in the posted interview.  Putin will halt the Russian advance prior to driving Ukrainian soldiers out of all of the territory that has been reincorporated into Russia.  It appears to be the case that the borders between Russia and Ukraine will be the current front line, so Putin is withdrawing Russia’s claim to the Russian territories still under Ukrainian occupation.

In exchange Washington will give de jure, that is legal, by right, recognition to Crimea as a constituent part of Russia, and Washington will give de facto, that is accept the facts on the ground whether legal or not, recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporozhye, and Kherson as provinces of Russia according to the present boundaries in the conflict.

By withholding de jure recognition of Russia’s battlefield gains, Ukraine can continue to claim, and demand return of, Russia’s battlefield gains. In other words, the agreement evades the central issue.

According to the agreement, Ukraine must renounce all NATO aspirations.  But Putin’s other demands, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine are apparently not included in the agreement.

Washington will lift the sanctions against Russia, and there will be US-Russia economic cooperation, which seems to mean that Russia will open aspects of its economy to foreigners for exploitation, a disastrous Russian decision.

This is what the Russian oligarchs and Atlanticist Integrationists, who have never supported the war, want.  How the Russia’s military feels about victory being shoved aside by a negotiated settlement is unknown.

But is it a settlement?  Zelensky’s latest statement at this time of writing is that he will not concede a square inch of territory to Russia.  If Zelensky has to be coerced, and as he is not legally or constitutionally the current president of Ukraine as his term of office has expired, successive Ukrainian governments can legitimately claim that the agreement is not valid.

Moreover,  Ukraine and Europe have placed themselves behind an alternative agreement.  In their proposed agreement, Ukraine will consent to begin talks with Russia, Europe, and the US about the territorial issues. Moreover, Ukraine will be granted US security guarantees similar to Article 5 in the NATO treaty.  In other words, Ukraine becomes essentially a de facto member of NATO.  Additionally, there will be no restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces or on the operations of foreign forces on Ukrainian territory, and Russia will compensate Ukraine for war damage.

Clearly, the two proposals have nothing in common.  Unless Europe gives in to Trump, a split is implied between the US and NATO, a split that could leave the US and Russia in an alliance that excludes Europe.  I have no explanation why Europe is taking this risk.

As we can see from the facts, only two of the four parties agree to the deal. Moreover, even if there is a deal, in the absence of de jure recognition of Russia’s territorial claims, the deal amounts to little more than kicking the can down the road.

In fact, John Helmer says that the deal is just a mechanism, a cover, for moving Russia aside so that Washington can get on with its war with China.

Here is how Helmer describes the situation:

“The politico-military strategy driving the US negotiators and prompting Trump’s tweets, is not a peace deal with Russia, nor even US withdrawal from the war in Europe. It is a strategy of sequencing one war at a time – the war in Europe to continue in the Ukraine with rearmed Germany, Poland and France in the lead, supported by Trump; and the US war against China in Asia.

“Sequencing these wars so as not to fight both enemies simultaneously – that’s the formula devised for Trump by Wess Mitchell, a former State Department appointee in the first Trump Administration,  and his business partner Elbridge Colby, now the third-ranking Pentagon official as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.   ‘The essence of diplomacy in strategy,’ Mitchell has just declaimed in Foreign Affairs, ‘is to rearrange power in space and time so that countries avoid tests of strength beyond their ability.’ . .

“Mitchell and Colby have convinced Trump and his negotiators that Russia has been badly damaged by the Ukrainian war which the Obama and Biden Administration have fought. Russian weakness, especially the perception that President Putin is both politically vulnerable and personally susceptible to US business inducements, is Trump’s strong card, and he should play it now.”

The goal is not peace, but to make money off of two wars: Europe and Ukraine’s war with Russia, and Washington’s war with China.  And perhaps a war with Iran for Israel thrown in.

Readers can listen to Helmer’s presentation of what he says is actually occurring in his discussion with Ray McGovern on Nima Alkhorshid’s program ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgG4ZmTZQww ), and they can read it in several of Helmer’s recent articles in Dancing with Bears ( https://johnhelmer.net/one-war-at-a-time-and-plenty-of-money-to-be-made-in-the-meantime-this-is-trumps-game-as-the-russian-and-chinese-general-staffs-understand/ ).

Helmer’s source for his explanation of what is really happening is an article in Foreign Affairs by West Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia in the first Trump term.  Mitchell is currently working with Trump’s current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to sequence America’s wars with Russia and China as the US lacks the power to take on both simultaneously. Mitchell’s article was published on April 22, 2025, in the May/June 2025 issue of Foreign Affairs.

Mitchell writes that the process of sequencing the wars with Russia and China should  begin “by bringing the war in Ukraine to an end in a way that is favorable to the United States. That means that when all is said and done, Kyiv must be strong enough to impede Russia’s westward advances” [for which no evidence exists, showing Mitchell’s mind to be controlled by the false narrative]. Washington should use the Korean War formula: “prioritize an armistice and push questions about a wider settlement into a separate process that could take years to bear fruit, it it ever does.”  This, of course, is what Washington’s de facto recognition of Russia’s territorial claims ensures.

Mitchell carelessly then reveals the intended deception of Babe-in-the-Woods Putin: “The United States should pursue a defense relationship with Ukraine akin to the one it maintains with Israel: not a formal alliance, but an agreement to sell, lend, or give Kyiv what it needs to defend itself. But it should not grant Ukraine [ de jure ] NATO membership. Instead, the United States should push European states to take responsibility for Ukraine—and for the security of their continent more generally.” This strategy capitalizes “on Putin’s special relationship with the Russian oligarchs” and dupes Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s negotiator, ” into pressing the Kremlin to accept a short-term military armistice which stops well short of the demilitarization and denazification goals of the Special Military Operation.”

So, as Mitchell describes it, the “peace agreement” is a Washington deception to set up, yet again,  “Babe-in-the Woods Putin” for the eventual destruction of Russia.

Can I believe this?  Yes, I can.  Helmer has  been watching things for a long time and reporting on them.  This scenario is not a product of Helmer’s imagination.  It is spelled out in an article in Foreign Affairs, long the arbiter of American foreign policy. The author, West Mitchell, a former Trump high official, clearly holds to the neoconservative policy stated by Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfwitz that the purpose of American foreign policy is hegemony over the world. If American hegemony requires war, war it is.

The Russians, with a large part of the mindless Russian establishment so desirous of being part of the West, have never paid any attention to the implication for Russian sovereignty of the neoconservative doctrine of US hegemony. This doctrine has not been denounced by President Trump. Consequently, Russia will be destroyed as the Russian government stupidly walks into deception after deception. Under Putin and Lavrov it will be one Minsk Agreement after another.

The question I have is:  Is Trump a part of the deception not only of Putin but also of the American people, or is this a deal he has accepted without realizing its consequences because he is desperate to end the conflict as he promised?  If Trump himself is part of the deception, then we have the explanation why the American Establishment did not prevent his reappearance in the Oval Office.

“The Return of Great-Power Diplomacy, How Strategic  Dealmaking Can Fortify American Power, by A. West Mitchell, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-great-power-diplomacy-strategy-wess-mitchell?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20250424 

In the post-Conciliar calendar this is the “Second Sunday of Easter”. In the 1962 Missale Romanum and in previous editions this Sunday is labelled: Dominica in Albis in Octava Paschae… Sunday in white garments on the Octave of Easter. In traditional parlance today is called “Low Sunday” or sometimes “Thomas Sunday” because of the Gospel reading about the doubting Apostle. It is called “Quasimodo…

Source

The EU must now deal with Russia without the old American myths

Recent statements from senior American officials have raised eyebrows. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington is beginning to better understand Russia’s position as Ukraine negotiations proceed. Simultaneously, Defense Secretary Peter Hegseth declared the era of the US serving as Europe’s sole security guarantor is over.

Is this a diplomatic victory for Russia? Not yet. There is still a long road ahead. But these signals from Washington should not be dismissed as mere tactical maneuvers. Rather, they suggest the growing possibility of a strategic compromise – the very goal Russia sought with its European security initiatives in December 2021. Tragically, many lives have been lost to bring the international system to this point, a grim reminder that significant change in global affairs rarely comes peacefully.

For 80 years, the European security order has been biased against Russia. Even when the USSR or Russia formally participated, it was merely a mechanism for limiting Russian influence. The entire postwar ‘legitimacy’ of the international order, as the late Henry Kissinger observed, rested on containing Russia. After 1945, Western countries prioritized Russia’s containment above even their own autonomy. To abandon this principle would acknowledge the collapse of the old order and the necessity of constructing a new one.

Today’s political upheavals in the US make this shift conceivable, although certainty remains distant. Washington’s erratic policy toward Ukraine is merely a symptom of deeper changes in Europe’s political architecture. It would be naive to believe that earlier American hostility toward Russian interests stemmed from ignorance. Americans have often been stereotyped as crude ‘nouveaux riches’, but the truth is that states act based on calculations of power and interest, not emotions or misunderstandings.

For all its peculiarities, America remains a sovereign power. And now, its relative decline forces a reassessment of priorities. Washington no longer has the luxury of fulfilling endless foreign obligations. Its voters – who ultimately foot the bill – demand that their leaders focus on domestic concerns. In such circumstances, the need to freeze the conflict with Russia becomes paramount.

Faced with a rising China and diminishing global influence, Washington sees little value in clinging to outdated commitments. Support for European satellites or the Kiev regime has become an unaffordable luxury. In reality, American ‘guarantees’ to Europe were always more myth than substance. Their primary purpose was psychological – to convince Russia that the West is invincible, thereby deterring challenges without having to justify the US military presence in Europe.

Even during the Cold War, after the mid-1950s, the USSR had no intention of attacking Western Europe. After 1991, all Russia sought from Europe was commerce and leisure. There was never any real need for an external ‘protector’ on the continent.

Moreover, American politicians prioritize their own people. No US government would sacrifice the lives of its citizens to fulfill formal pledges to foreign nations. Even during the past three years, the greatest danger of escalation between the US and Russia stemmed not from a hypothetical defense of Europe, but from direct security risks involving American interests.

Western Europeans, of course, have long understood that US security guarantees are a convenient fiction. Even the most Russophobic regimes in the Baltics know this. But for decades, the EU states relied on this myth to justify hostile policies toward Russia while avoiding the burden of real defense expenditures. It became the ideological glue holding the European project together. Without it, they are at a loss: They have no alternative vision for a common order that isn’t based on enmity toward Russia.

The likely retreat of American leadership from Europe does not mean Russia should rush forward aggressively. On the contrary, it should proceed with cold-blooded calculation. War has never been the preferred tool of Russian foreign policy. Throughout history, Russia has favored diplomacy, even when progress was slow and interrupted by conflict. Patience has been its great strength.

Thus, Russia’s response to American disengagement will be measured and cautious. We are even prepared to assist our American colleagues in ‘explaining’ their evolving position to their allies. After all, a sudden epiphany regarding Russian interests requires careful handling.

In the emerging world, change will not be defined by grand declarations, but by the steady reassertion of sovereignty and the quiet death of the illusions that once governed international relations.

This article was first published by Vzglyad newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team.

A formal agreement should have been sealed three weeks ago, the US president has said

Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky is “three weeks late” in signing a minerals deal with the US, President Donald Trump has said. In a post on Truth Social on Friday, he demanded the agreement be signed “immediately.”

Washington and Kiev have been negotiating a deal for weeks that would grant the US access to Ukraine’s natural resources, including rare-earth minerals that are vital for high-tech industries.

Ukraine hopes the deal will secure the US as a lasting security partner, a commitment that the Trump administration has so far declined to make. Washington insists the deal should compensate America for past aid in the conflict with Russia. Kiev, however, claims the assistance was provided unconditionally.

A preliminary Memorandum of Intent was signed last week, according to Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, Yulia Sviridenko. Trump, however, has complained that the process is dragging on too long.

“Ukraine, headed by Vladimir Zelensky, has not signed the final papers on the very important Rare Earths Deal with the United States. It is at least three weeks late. Hopefully, it will be signed IMMEDIATELY,” he wrote.

The deal was expected to be signed in February during a visit by Zelensky visit to the White House. The event, however, devolved into a heated spat between the leaders, with Trump accusing Zelensky of disrespecting America and showing ingratitude for US aid, while being reluctant to seek peace with Russia and “gambling with World War III.” Trump later said Zelensky was “trying to back out” of the deal, warning that he faces “big, big problems” if he does.

Last week, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said White House officials were “still working on the details” of when and where the signing would take place, but expected that negotiations would be completed by April 26. The Memorandum of Intent also outlines this timeline.

In his post on Friday, Trump also commented on Ukraine peace efforts, saying “work on the overall Peace Deal between Russia and Ukraine is going smoothly” and that “success seems to be in the future.” In another post, he indicated plans to meet with Russian and Ukrainian representatives on Saturday in Rome, where he is attending Pope Francis’ funeral, which Zelensky also plans to attend.

“They are very close to a deal, and the two sides should now meet, at very high levels, to finish it off. Most of the major points are agreed to,” Trump wrote.

READ MORE: Zelensky contradicts Trump on deal with Russia

While the details have not been officially disclosed, the agreement proposed by Washington reportedly includes US recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, a “freezing” of the conflict along the current front lines, acknowledgment of Moscow’s control over large parts of the four former Ukrainian regions that voted to join Russia, and formal opposition to Ukraine’s NATO bid.