The US leader believes a deal between Kiev and Moscow is “quite close,” according to Alar Karis

US President Donald Trump has promised not to walk away from the Ukraine peace process, stating that an end to the hostilities was “quite close,” Estonian head of state Alar Karis has claimed.

The Estonian president revealed that he’d had a conversation with Trump at Pope Francis’ funeral on Saturday, where the two were seated together. Ahead of the ceremony, Trump also had a brief meeting with Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky.

Karis said he had urged Trump to keep the Ukraine peace process moving and not to “walk away at some point.” The US president allegedly pledged to stay engaged in the negotiations, “saying we are quite close because he had just met Zelensky. I didn’t ask for many details about what that meeting brought,” Karis told Estonian broadcaster ERR.

The two leaders also discussed strained transatlantic relations, with Trump insisting he valued them too, according to Karis. “These are important to both of us, not only from a European perspective but also from the American perspective, and President Donald Trump agreed with that. Now we have to see how to make these relations better than they currently are,” he said.

Shortly after the Zelensky meeting and the Pope’s funeral, Trump accused Russia of “shooting missiles” into Ukraine for “no reason” and threatened the country with new sanctions.

Moscow has maintained that it targets only military installations and facilities used by Kiev’s forces, rejecting accusations of deliberately striking civilian sites. Following a brief lull in fighting during the Easter ceasefire announced by President Vladimir Putin last weekend, the Russian military carried out multiple long-range strikes against Ukrainian military and industrial targets over the week.

“There was no reason for Putin to be shooting missiles into civilian areas, cities, and towns over the last few days. It makes me think that maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along, and has to be dealt with differently, through ‘Banking’ or ‘Secondary Sanctions’?” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

The warning came just as the Russian president reiterated Moscow’s readiness for unconditional talks with Kiev. The president reaffirmed the commitment during talks with Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff on Friday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said. 

It is a matter of historical record that, years before the conclave of 2005 which elected Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger as Pope Benedict XVI, a group of centre-left European prelates – known as the “Sankt Gallen Group” after the Swiss city where they met – consciously sought a less doctrinaire alternative for the next pope and believed they had found their man in Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Argentina.

Bergoglio did not prevail in 2005, but he ascended to the papacy eight years later at the conclave of 2013.

So far as we know, there is no equivalent Sankt Gallen Group on the Catholic centre-right today, scheming to secure the election of a more conservative figure this time around. As a thought exercise, however, let us assume such a cabal existed: who might their candidate be?

For some time now, the consensus answer has been 72-year-old Cardinal Péter Erdő of Budapest, Hungary, making him the most obvious – and perhaps the most promising – “discontinuity” candidate in the looming conclave.

Born in 1952 as the first of six children, Erdő grew up in a committed Catholic family, later recalling that “the faith was woven into the fabric of our lives.” In such an environment, it was natural for him to feel the stirrings of a vocation to the priesthood. He entered the seminary in both Esztergom and Budapest, and was ordained in 1975. Demonstrating a nimble mind, he was sent for further studies to the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome, where he discovered an aptitude for canon law.

For a time, it appeared Erdő was destined for an academic career, serving as professor of theology and canon law at the seminary in Esztergom, as well as guest lecturer at various European universities. However, in November 1999, he was appointed auxiliary bishop of Székesfehérvár, signalling that his rise within the ecclesiastical hierarchy would not stop there.

In December 2002, Erdő was named Archbishop of Esztergom-Budapest, becoming the Primate of Hungary. When Pope John Paul II created him cardinal in 2003 at the age of 51, Erdő was widely regarded as one of the rising stars of the Catholic Church.

Nothing in the years since has dispelled that perception. Erdő was twice elected president of the Council of European Bishops’ Conferences, in 2005 and 2011, reflecting the respect and trust he commands among his peers. He has also been entrusted with delicate assignments in Rome, notably in 2011 when he was asked to mediate a dispute in Peru between the conservative Cardinal Juan Luis Cipriani Thorne and the more left-leaning Pontifical Catholic University.

In 2014 and 2015, Erdő served as relator – effectively chairman – of Pope Francis’s contentious Synods of Bishops on the Family, where the key issue was whether divorced and civilly remarried Catholics should be permitted to receive Communion. Although it was clear that Pope Francis favoured a more permissive approach, Erdő maintained his more restrictive stance, using his opening address in 2015 to assert that the ban on Communion in such cases was not an “arbitrary prohibition” but intrinsic to the nature of marriage as a permanent union.

In other areas too, Erdő is generally seen as cautious and conservative. During the height of the European migrant crisis in 2015, when Pope Francis urged Catholic institutions to shelter migrants and refugees, Erdő warned that indiscriminate hospitality could risk making the Church complicit in human trafficking.

He enjoys warm relations with Hungary’s Fidesz government under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. In September 2023, he attended an exclusive annual gathering for Fidesz insiders and VIPs, prompting speculation about close ties between Church and state. Some believe that Hungary’s state-controlled media is subtly promoting Erdő’s candidacy for the Throne of Peter.

Supporters argue that Erdő’s rapport with Orbán could prove advantageous in navigating the challenges of statecraft as pope. However, he has also faced criticism, notably from the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, over allegations of mishandling a clerical abuse case. His defenders insist his involvement was minimal and appropriate.

What is the case for Erdő? Fundamentally, he is seen as the ideal candidate for those wishing to guide the Church in a more traditional direction without openly repudiating Pope Francis’s legacy. Diplomatic and conflict-averse, Erdő has been described by one Italian newspaper as the “friendly traditionalist.”

His expertise in canon law would assist in navigating the complex legal reforms introduced during the Francis pontificate. His deep experience in European affairs could also serve the Church well at a time when Europe’s geopolitical role is shifting, offering the papacy a platform for renewed moral and spiritual leadership.

Few doubt Erdő’s gravitas – his intellectual and cultural depth is widely acknowledged. Under his leadership, many believe the Church would be in steady hands.

The case against him? However diplomatic he may be, Erdő’s election would likely be interpreted as a rejection of the Francis era, a move many of the 135 cardinal electors may be reluctant to make. Critics also argue that while Erdő possesses gravitas, he lacks the charisma needed to capture global attention in the way recent popes have done. Additionally, after the global outreach of Pope Francis, some fear that electing a European figure could be seen as a retreat, given that nearly three-quarters of the world’s 1.3 billion Catholics live outside the West.

Twice during Pope Francis’s pontificate, Erdő helped organise papal visits to Hungary, in 2021 and 2023. Whether he will return again as a pope himself – this time as the VIP in white – remains to be seen.

The post ‘Papabile’ of the Day: Cardinal Péter Erdő first appeared on Catholic Herald.

The post ‘Papabile’ of the Day: Cardinal Péter Erdő appeared first on Catholic Herald.

In the final stage of his earthly journey, Pope Francis was entombed on Saturday in the papal Basilica of Saint Mary Major, a sign of his deep devotion to Mary and his desire to remain accessible to the people.

Some 150,000 people lined the streets to bid a final farewell as Pope Francis’s coffin was carried in an open popemobile during a historic procession from St Peter’s Basilica to the Basilica of Saint Mary Major.

Described by veteran Vatican reporter and analyst Elisabetta Piqué as “the last surprise of a pope of surprises”, the popemobile was an unexpected addition to the funeral procession, as many had anticipated a dark hearse or similar vehicle to carry the coffin to its final resting place.

Upon arrival at Saint Mary Major, the pope’s coffin was welcomed by a group of poor and homeless people, symbolising those whom he prioritised throughout his life and ministry.

Children placed roses on the altar inside the Pauline Chapel of the basilica, which houses the famed icon Maria Salus Populi Romani (Mary, Health of the Roman People) – an image Pope Francis visited after his election, and before and after every international trip.

On each visit, Francis would leave a bouquet of roses as a sign of his devotion to Mary and gratitude for the graces he had received. His final visit to the chapel took place on April 12, shortly before Holy Week and just over a week before his death. After being discharged from Rome’s Gemelli Hospital on March 23, he drove to the basilica, delivering flowers but remaining in the car.

Francis’s tomb is located just outside the chapel, in a niche previously used for storing candelabra.

Irish-American Cardinal Kevin Farrell, the Vatican Camerlengo, sealed Pope Francis’s coffin during the burial ceremony in the Basilica of Saint Mary Major on April 26, 2025. He was entombed at 1pm local time during a 30-minute rite presided over by Cardinal Farrell, who governs the Holy See during the sede vacante, along with a small number of senior members of the College of Cardinals.

The tombstone, bearing the simple Latin inscription Franciscus, is made of greyish slate from Liguria, honouring his maternal great-grandfather, Vincenzo Sivori, who emigrated from Italy to Argentina in the 19th century.

For a pope who once said he felt confined behind Vatican walls and who thrived on closeness to the people, his burial in Saint Mary Major – far more accessible than St Peter’s – is deeply symbolic.

Francis, known for shunning tradition and maintaining a cautious mistrust of the Vatican’s governing structures, chose to be buried outside that context, in a place of popular devotion open to all. It is a fitting conclusion to his impactful papacy.

The basilica, constructed in 435, has long housed the beloved Maria Salus Populi Romani, an ancient Byzantine icon of Mary and the Child Jesus, traditionally believed to have been painted by St Luke and brought to Rome in the 6th century.

A favourite among Jesuits, the icon is one of Rome’s most venerated images, credited over the centuries with miraculous interventions, including ending the Black Death, halting a cholera epidemic, and securing victory at the Battle of Lepanto.

Pope Francis’s devotion to the icon began on March 14, 2013, the day after his election, when he visited the basilica to entrust his papacy to Mary. From then on, he visited the image frequently – often 10 to 15 times a year – though less so towards the end of his life.

These visits began with his first international trip to Rio de Janeiro in July 2013 and became a hallmark of his pontificate.

First canonically crowned in 1838 by Pope Gregory XVI and again in 1954 by Pope Pius XII, the Salus, as it is affectionately known, resides in the Pauline Chapel, also called the “Borghese” Chapel.

According to tradition, the basilica was built following a miraculous snowfall in August, after Mary appeared in a dream to Pope Liberius and a devout couple, requesting a church be erected where snow would fall that night. When snow did fall, Pope Liberius marked the church’s outline, and construction was completed a century later by Pope Sixtus III after the Council of Ephesus declared Mary the Mother of God.

The dedication of the basilica is commemorated annually with a three-day celebration, culminating in a Mass during which white flower petals fall from the ceiling to recall the miraculous snow.

Pope Francis led Vespers for this feast for the first time in 2024, praying silently as rose petals showered down, before visiting the Salus icon once more.

Legend holds that when St Helen discovered the icon in the 4th century and brought it to Rome, miracles began to occur. Pope Gregory the Great is said to have carried it in procession during a deadly plague in 590, after which the Archangel Michael was seen sheathing his sword atop what is now Castel Sant’Angelo, signalling the plague’s end.

Another plague was said to have ceased when Pope St Pius V processed with the Salus to St Peter’s Basilica in the late 16th century.

The current chapel was commissioned by Pope Paul V in 1605. Pope Pius XII visited in 1950 after proclaiming the dogma of the Assumption and crowned the icon again in 1954.

Pope Francis joins a long line of pontiffs devoted to the icon, but his bond was notably profound.

In many ways, the icon and the basilica encapsulate Francis’s papacy – from the “miracle” he spoke of at its outset, to his Marian devotion, emphasis on a maternal Church, and his desire to remain close to the people in prayer and solidarity.

Now, he has ensured that this spirit will accompany him not only in death but for generations to come.

(Photo by DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Francis, ‘the people’s pope’, entombed in his favourite Roman basilica first appeared on Catholic Herald.

The post Francis, ‘the people’s pope’, entombed in his favourite Roman basilica appeared first on Catholic Herald.

This is the first of a three-part series on the history of NATO and US European Command military exercises with Ukraine. This shows how the West, acting like a camel, slipped its big nose under the Ukrainian tent as part of a long-term strategy to defeat Russia. While many of these exercises were touted as peacekeeping in nature, the real purpose was to train and equip Ukraine with the ultimate goal of fighting and defeating Russia. In July 1998, for example, NATO’s Sea Breeze maritime exercise included anti-submarine warfare. WTF??? That ain’t peacekeeping. That is preparation to fight Russia in the Black Sea.

The process of making Ukraine a de facto member of NATO started in 1992, one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1994 marked the first year that Ukrainian forces participated in NATO exercises, although these were held in Poland and the Netherlands. The following year, 1995, witnessed the creation of Ukraine’s Yavoriv military base as the NATO training center, although this was not formalized until 1999.

1999 was no coincidence… it was the year that NATO expanded to the East by accepting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members on March 12, 1999. This provoked alarm in Russia because it obliterated the promise of former US Secretary of State James Baker, that NATO would not move one inch to the East. President Bill Clinton broke that promise.

Part 2 will cover the period, 2000 – 2010. Part 3 will cover 2011 – 2021. The plan to use Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia was born in the 1990s and matured into war in 2022. I hope you find this informative.

1992

NATO-Ukraine Relations in 1992 — In 1992, Ukraine formally established relations with NATO by joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in March 1992. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established by NATO in December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation between NATO member states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

The NACC ostensibly was created to foster political consultation and build confidence between former adversaries, reflecting NATO’s “hand of friendship” to the newly independent and transitioning states of Central and Eastern Europe, which also included Russia. The NACC’s activities paved the way for deeper cooperation, notably leading to the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, which allowed for more practical and individualized cooperation between NATO and partner countries.

In 1997, the NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which expanded the partnership framework to include more countries and provided a more sophisticated forum for dialogue and cooperation, reflecting the evolving security environment and the deepening relationships between NATO and its partners. Russia also joined EAPC, but was suspended from the organization in 2014 after the people of Crimea voted to reunite with Russia.

• Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO began in March 1992 when it joined the newly established NACC, marking the start of formal relations and opening the door for future military cooperation .
• The first concrete participation of Ukraine in a NATO-linked military exercise did not occur until September 1994, when Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and participated in joint training exercises such as “Cooperation Bridge” in Poland .

1993

In 1993, Ukraine began its military cooperation with the United States and NATO, although it had not yet joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (which happened in 1994). The most significant development in 1993 was the initiation of the U.S.-Ukraine State Partnership Program (SPP), established between the California National Guard and Ukraine. This program laid the groundwork for ongoing joint training, military exchanges, and exercises.

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) advocated for establishing a Military Liaison Team (MLT) in Kyiv as early as 1993, but the deployment was delayed due to diplomatic considerations. Nonetheless, military cooperation and engagement activities were ongoing under the Defense Attaché Office. The cooperation in 1993 set the stage for more formal and larger-scale military exercises such as “Peace Shield” and “Sea Breeze,” which began after Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994.

1994

Cooperative Bridge 94

• In September 1994, Ukraine participated in its first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint training exercise,
  “Cooperative Bridge 94,” held at the Biedrusko military training area near Poznan, Poland, from 12 to 16 September 1994 .
• This exercise involved approximately 600 soldiers from 13 NATO and Partner nations, including Ukraine, and focused on basic unit and individual peacekeeping tasks and skills.
• The aim was to share peacekeeping experience, develop a common understanding of operational procedures, and improve interoperability among NATO and Partner military forces .
• The exercise was conducted under the supervision of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and was jointly planned with Polish military authorities.

Spirit of Partnership

Later in 1994, a Ukrainian air-mobile unit participated in another PfP training exercise called “Spirit of Partnership,” held in the Netherlands.

1995

Peace Shield 1995:

The primary NATO/USEUCOM military exercise conducted with Ukraine in 1995 was “Peace Shield,” a joint US-Ukrainian exercise held at the Yavoriv training area near Lviv from May 23 to May 27, 1995. This exercise was part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which aimed to increase interoperability and cooperation between NATO and partner countries, including Ukraine.

Autumn Allies 95:
Another notable exercise was “Autumn Allies 95,” which involved approximately 400 U.S. Marines and 200 Ukrainian soldiers. The exercise focused on promoting interoperability in peacekeeping operations and was conducted later in 1995.

The Partnership for Peace program was central to these activities, providing a framework for joint exercises, training, and defense planning between Ukraine, NATO, and USEUCOM.

1996

Cossack Step-96:

In 1996, Ukraine hosted a military exercise called “Cossack Step-96” in cooperation with Great Britain. This exercise was conducted “in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP),” NATO’s program for building trust and
interoperability with non-member countries, including Ukraine at the time. The exercise involved approximately 140 participants from Ukraine and Great Britain.

During this period, Ukraine was actively increasing its military cooperation with NATO through the PfP framework, which included joint training and exercises aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s ability to participate in multinational operations with NATO forces. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) was involved in
developing security cooperation with Ukraine, focusing on familiarization activities, military professionalism, and closer ties to NATO.

1997

Cooperative Neighbor-97:

In July 1997, Ukraine hosted the Cooperative Neighbor-97 joint exercise at the Yavoriv training grounds in western Ukraine. The exercise involved approximately 1,200 soldiers from the United States, Greece, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Macedonia. Cooperative Neighbor-97 was conducted under NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which aimed to build
trust and interoperability between NATO members and partner countries. The exercise focused on joint training and cooperation, and was observed by U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk.

Sea Breeze 1997:

Sea Breeze 1997 was a multinational maritime exercise cohosted by the United States and Ukraine in the Black Sea region. The exercise included U.S. Marines and Ukrainian forces and was initially planned to simulate an intervention in a fictional ethnic conflict, but the scenario was changed due to Russian
sensitivities. The revised scenario focused on providing humanitarian aid after an earthquake. The land-based segments were moved from Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland to avoid local protests and Russian
opposition. While conducted “in the spirit of NATO’s Partnership for Peace,” NATO itself maintained a hands-off approach, with only Turkey among NATO members sending ships to participate directly.

Significance:

Both exercises were part of the broader NATO-Ukraine cooperation established by the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, signed in July 1997, which set the framework for ongoing military and political collaboration. These exercises marked early steps in Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and were designed to enhance interoperability, readiness, and mutual understanding between Ukraine, NATO, and U.S. European Command forces.

1998

Cossack Express 1998 (May 1998)

• Location: Ukraine (multiple sites).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other PfP nations.
• Focus: Disaster response, humanitarian aid, and crisis management.
• Significance: Aimed at improving civil-military coordination in emergencies.

Peace Shield 1998 (June 1998)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) focused on peacekeeping operations, crisis response, and interoperability with NATO standards.
• Significance: Part of the “Peace Shield” series, which began in 1995 to prepare Ukrainian forces for potential NATO-led peacekeeping missions.

Sea Breeze 1998 (July 1998)

• Location: Black Sea (near Odesa, Ukraine)
• Participants: Ukraine, the U.S., and other NATO partners.
• Focus: Maritime security, search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the annual “Sea Breeze” series (started in 1997), enhancing Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO in Black Sea operations.

Cooperative Nugget 1998 (September 1998)

• Location: Hohenfels Training Area, Germany (part of the Cooperative Partner series).
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S., and other NATO/PfP countries.
• Focus: Peacekeeping operations, joint command structures, and multinational coordination.
• Significance: Helped Ukrainian forces train alongside NATO troops in a simulated UN/NATO-style peacekeeping mission.

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and other U.S. military entities were actively engaged in planning and executing military-to-military contacts and exercises with Ukraine in 1998, focusing on familiarization, confidence building, and demonstrating U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty . The annual planners’ conference for military contacts was held in April 1998 in Stuttgart, Germany, to develop the 1999 plan, indicating ongoing and planned engagement. The transition of responsibility for U.S. military engagement in Ukraine from the Joint Staff to USEUCOM was underway in 1998, further institutionalizing these activities. The establishment of a Regional Training Centre at the Yavoriv training area in Ukraine was discussed as a future initiative for multinational training and exercises.

1999

Peace Shield 99 (May 1999)

• Location: Yavoriv Training Area, Ukraine (near Lviv)
• Participants: Ukraine, NATO members (including the U.S.), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries.
• Focus: Command post exercise (CPX) focused on peacekeeping operations, interoperability, and crisis response.
• Significance: One of Ukraine’s major annual multinational exercises under the PfP framework.

Cooperative Partner 99 (June–July 1999)

• Location: Ukraine (Odesa and Myrhorod regions)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. (USEUCOM), and other NATO/PfP nations.
• Focus: Maritime and air operations, including search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and naval interoperability.
• Significance: Part of the Cooperative Partner series, enhancing Black Sea security cooperation.

Sea Breeze 99 (July–August 1999)

• Location: Black Sea (Odesa and Crimea)
• Participants: Ukraine, U.S. Navy (6th Fleet), NATO allies (including Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria), and PfP countries.
• Focus: Maritime security, amphibious operations, and crisis response.
• Significance: Part of the annual Sea Breeze series, which began in 1997 and continues today.

Cossack Express-99 (September 1999):

Held at the Yavoriv training grounds in Ukraine starting September 18, 1999, this NATO-sponsored exercise involved British and Ukrainian motorized infantry units of battalionsize. The exercise focused on rehearsing joint actions in UN authorized peacekeeping operations under NATO command, modeled after operations in the Balkans.

Cossack Steppe-99:

Conducted at the Nowa Deba training range in Poland beginning September 20, 1999, this exercise included company-sized motorized infantry units from Ukraine, Poland (a new NATO member at the time), and Britain. It also rehearsed joint peacekeeping operations under NATO command, with participation from the Ukrainian-Polish joint battalion.

Black Sea Partnership-99:

From September 20–25, 1999, the Ukrainian navy’s flagship Hetman Sahaydachny participated alongside NATO and partner country warships in this exercise, which was held mostly in Turkish waters. The aim was to practice joint naval operations and naval support for NATO-led peacekeeping operations on land.

CONCLUSION:

I spent 23 years scripting military exercises for US Special Forces. While I was not involved in the scripting of any of these NATO/US military exercises, I understand the purpose and process of them. These were not harmless games. They were designed to train and equip the Ukrainian military to fight Russia, potentially with NATO’s direct involvement. We have seen that come to fruition since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. It is no coincidence that Russia hit the Yavoriv NATO military facility on March 13, 2022.

Reprinted with permission from Sonar21.

A RORATE Guide to the Cardinals and the Conclave

Read more »

William Cash, former editor of the Catholic Herald, on Pope Francis’s funeral and legacy

The sight of Donald Trump and his Catholic First Lady being given a special dispensation to pray for a few moments before the coffin of Pope Francis was a reminder of how religion has returned not only to the forefront of US politics but is now centre stage in world affairs. This was made even more evident by the extraordinary sight of Trump and Ukraine’s President Zelensky sitting down in St Peter’s for a pre-funeral diplomatic chat, which Zelensky described as having the “potential to become historic”.

Joe Biden – a cradle Catholic who supports abortion – was also there, having been notably absent from the 2023 funeral of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI. The last US president to attend a papal funeral was George W. Bush for Pope St John Paul II – now raised to the altars of the Church – in 2005.

With St Peter’s basking in the deepest of clear blue skies, unscarred by the plume of airline traffic, President Trump’s presence in front of the Vatican’s phalanx of scarlet-clad cardinal-electors who concelebrated the majestic outdoor Mass is a reminder of how America, with its 60 million Catholics, has now become a global battleground for the Church and her future. The next pope will shape the faith of some 1.4 billion Catholics for a generation or more.

The cardinals resembled a praetorian guard of Roman senators during an interregnum vacuum of power. Trump had to be there, of course, as he was partly only in Rome thanks to the millions of diverse American Catholics watching the service back in the US. Some 59 per cent of US Catholics (especially Hispanics) voted for him.

Significantly, the first reading was in English by American Kielce Gussie, who works as a journalist at Vatican News. She read several verses from the Acts of the Apostles.

As a former editor of the Catholic Herald, I had a strange mix of feelings watching the Requiem Mass of a pope who liked to be known as the Great Reformer. Whilst in Rome back in late February, when Pope Francis was critically ill, I spent an hour inside the Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore where he will be buried. He will be the first pope to be laid to rest outside the Vatican City walls for many years.

Having his tumultuous and controversial reign as pope end in what can only be described as an unfashionable budget-tourist neighbourhood of two-star hotels and kebab shops seems almost fitting. It is not a glitzy or wealthy area; it is poor and shabby. Other than the beautiful basilica – one of the Seven Basilicas that pilgrims hundreds of years ago visited on their way into Rome along the Via Francigena – there are few reasons to go there.

It was only when I found myself alone in the church, where I made my confession and attended Mass, that I learned another reason why Pope Francis may have chosen to be buried there. A small plaque revealed that it was in the church of Santa Maria Maggiore where St Ignatius Loyola – founder of the Jesuits – celebrated his first Mass on Christmas Day 1538.

Pope Francis, of course, was the first Jesuit pontiff; he was a bundle of paradoxes and contradictions but clearly a man bent on a holy mission. While he rests in the basilica, he will be keeping company with Rome’s famous Marian icon, Maria Salus Populi Romani, which he was especially moved by.

Pope Francis entrusted his apostolic journeys to the protection of the Salus Populi Romani, an icon that became a special friend as he prayed to her before setting out on all 47 of his papal journeys abroad and on his return to the Vatican – it is a Jesuit tradition. Ever since its foundation, the Society of Jesus has been especially devoted to this rarest of icons. Its extraordinary history explains why the church – one of the four papal basilicas of Rome – is regarded as perhaps the most important sanctuary dedicated to the Virgin Mary in the Western world. Pope Gregory I (590–604) is said to have paused in prayer in front of the icon to implore for an end to the plague.

Popes have given generous donations to the icon as ex-voto offerings: from Clement VIII (1592–1605) to Gregory XVI (1831–1846) and Pius XII (1939–1958), pontiffs have given crowns and jewellery, praying for the intercession entrusted to Salus Populi Romani during various highly challenging times for the Church.

Again, this seems fitting. Pope Francis leaves a legacy of division as well as an almighty set of challenges to bring the Church back together. Catholics around the world, and especially in America, are looking for a pope to heal wounds – one who will unify the Church as it tries to overcome the daily siege of secularisation.

Throughout my time as Herald editor, it was impossible not to admit that Francis was blessed with a charismatic brand of unpredictable, almost fierce energy – often turning explosive – and had a special affinity with the young, poor, downtrodden and dispossessed. I certainly felt his holiness on the various occasions I was close to him, such as in St Peter’s Square when he blessed the crowd after the canonisation of St John Henry Newman. A friend recently described Francis to me as our “Good Shepherd tending to a flock under siege by packs of voracious wolves.” Whoever the next pope is, the first thing that must be done is to try to heal wounds.

Historians will surely regard Pope Francis as one of the most progressive, paradoxical and divisive popes in over 2,000 years of Christian history. The progressive nuances of his political playbook often showed what even his own British friend and biographer Austen Ivereigh referred to as a “certain sharpness, even bitterness” in his character when it came to score-settling or defying tradition, particularly in handing out red hats to those archbishops who might normally expect one.

He enjoyed being a papal “disruptor”, but his modernising agenda often seemed designed to punish traditionalists. My heart missed a beat when Cardinal Giovanni Battista Re, Dean of the College of Cardinals, who led the papal funeral Mass, said in his measured and enlightened homily that Francis “opened his heart” to everybody. Some orthodox Catholic leaders – such as Cardinal Zen – might not agree, nor would the late Cardinal Pell, who was imprisoned on spurious claims of sex abuse whilst bravely trying to reform Vatican finances.

When Fiducia Supplicans, which was designed to appear as though it allowed the blessing of same-sex relationships, backfired, he had to row back and issue clarifications. It damaged his authority, and a 2024 Gallup poll found that 30 per cent of American Catholics had a “disfavourable” view of Pope Francis – the highest recorded.

Bishops in Africa – led by Cardinal Ambongo – jointly declared that they could not apply the “pastoral” blessings proposed in the Vatican declaration without causing scandal. As a result, Francis quickly adopted a volte-face and gave African bishops an exemption on this highly contentious issue. But the Holy See’s authority was damaged, and the “for clarity” memos became embarrassing.

Pope Francis also reopened the liturgy wars, which seemed unnecessary. Last year, the Herald was involved in getting an “Agatha Christie II” letter together after newly hardened restrictions were imposed on the Traditional Latin Mass. A 2024 variant of the original 1971 letter was published in The Times, with new signatures gathered thanks to the Catholic composer Sir James MacMillan and Joseph Shaw of the Latin Mass Society.

As editor, I received many letters despairing of Pope Francis’s seemingly open hostility towards traditional Catholics, at a time when many younger Catholics were actively embracing the Latin Mass as a way of bringing fresh energy, vocations and numbers into the Church. I couldn’t understand – and still cannot – why the Pope embarked on a course of action that wilfully divided Catholic communities. “The Catholic Church is Being Ripped Apart,” wrote The New York Times.

Pope Francis often also seemed somewhat disconnected from his own priestly flock. Back in November 2023, I recall us publishing a remarkable poll of US Catholic seminarians undertaken by the Catholic University in Washington – it found that 80 per cent identified as “traditional” or orthodox, and rejected the progressive Francis agenda. It said that young liberal priests had “all but vanished”.

It seemed clear that the direction Pope Francis was trying to take the Church was at odds with the feelings and views of mainstream Catholics who believe the Magisterium has been harmed, even vandalised, by excessive progressiveness over the past 60 years – seemingly for its own sake and out of apathy towards traditional Church teaching and morally rooted Western culture.

As editor, I often felt that our mission was to “hold the old City gates” against the forces of progress, secularisation and the soulless digital age. I use the word City, in upper case, as I felt our team of scribbler knights and editors were actually – if it doesn’t sound too ridiculous – trying to hold the gates of the City of God. Sometimes, alas, as our Herald foot soldiers stood on the battlements, it felt as if the ancient gates of the Catholic Church were under siege by progressive forces within the Church itself.

Looking back, it feels a shame that rather too much of my time – and that of the brilliant Herald team, now led decisively by Serenhedd James – was spent channelling our intellectual and reporting energies into trying to fathom exactly what Francis was thinking, and often finding ourselves half-defending him in the spirit of constructive criticism rather than focusing on stories that celebrated the real meaning of the living faith of the Catholic spirit today, as interpreted through the Gospel and scriptures. We spent too much time, inevitably, on Pope Francis’s politicisation of faith.

Pope Francis will not be easily forgotten; he made his mark on the world, and worked to the very end, defying doctors’ orders. But he has left the Church – and the next Successor of Peter – with a range of challenges that are unenviable in their complexity. He was an agent of change, and saw himself as a force for spiritual good, driven by his Jesuit missionary zeal. He had a great passion for the poor and relinquished the red shoes.

It was almost impossible not to be moved when, at the end of the Requiem Mass, the Canticle of the Blessed Virgin Mary was said and we heard the fitting lines: “He has shown strength with his arm; he has scattered the proud in the thoughts of their hearts.” But let us pray that the next pope will take the Church in a more conciliatory and less polarising direction.

(Photo by Tiziana FABI / AFP)

The post Requiem for a Pope first appeared on Catholic Herald.

The post Requiem for a Pope appeared first on Catholic Herald.

Trump clearly is in the midst of an existential conflict. He has a landslide mandate. But is ringed by a resolute domestic enemy front in the form of an “industrial concern” infused with Deep State ideology, centred primarily on preserving U.S. global power (rather than on mending of the economy).

The key MAGA issue however is not foreign policy, but how to structurally re-balance an economic paradigm in danger of an extinction event. Trump has always been clear that this forms his primordial goal. His coalition of supporters are fixed on the need to revive America’s industrial base, so as to provide reasonably well-paid jobs to the MAGA corps.

Trump may for now have a mandate, but extreme danger lurks – not just the Deep State and the Israeli lobby. The Yellen debt bomb is the more existential threat. It threatens Trump’s support in Congress, because the bomb is set to explode shortly before the 2026 midterms. New tariff revenues, DOGE savings, and even the upcoming Gulf shake-down are all centred on getting some sort of fiscal order in place, so that $9 trillion plus of short-term debt – maturing imminently – can be rolled over to the longer term without resort to eye-watering interest rates. It is Yellen-Democrat’s little trip wire for the Trump agenda.

So far, the general context seems plain enough. Yet, on the minutiae of how exactly to re-balance the economy; how to manage the “debt bomb;” and how far DOGE should go with its cuts, divisions in Trump’s team are present. In fact, the tariff war and the China tussle bring into contention a fresh phalanx of opposition: i.e. those (some on Wall Street, oligarchs, etc.) who have prospered mightily from the golden era of free-flowing, seemingly limitless, money-creation; those who were enriched, precisely by the policies that have made America subservient to the looming American “debt knell.”

Yet to make matters more complex, two of the key components to Trump’s mooted “re-balancing” and debt “solution” cannot be whispered, let alone said aloud: One reason is that it involves deliberately devaluing “the dollar in your pocket.” And secondly, many more Americans are going to lose their jobs.

That is not exactly a popular “sell.” Which is probably why the “re-balance” has not been well explained to the public.

Trump launched the Liberation “Tariff Shock” seemingly minded to crash-start a restructuring of international trade relations – as the first step towards a general re-alignment of major currency values.

China however, wasn’t buying into the tariff and trade restrictions “stuff,” and matters quickly escalated. It looked for a moment as if the Trump “Coalition” might fracture under the pressure of the concomitant crisis in the U.S. bond market to the tariff fracas that shook confidence.

The Coalition, in fact, held; markets subsided, but then the Coalition fractured over a foreign policy issue – Trump’s hope to normalise relations with Russia, towards a Great Global Reset.

A major strand within the Trump Coalition (apart from MAGA populists) are the neocons and Israeli Firsters. Some sort of Faustian bargain supposedly was struck by Trump at the outset through a deal that had his team heavily peopled by zealous Israeli-Firsters.

Simply put, the breadth of coalition that Trump thought he needed to win the election and deliver an economic re-balance also included two foreign policy pillars: Firstly, the reset with Moscow – the pillar by which to end the “forever wars,” which his Populist base despised. And the second pillar being the neutering of Iran as a military power and source of resistance, on which both Israeli Firsters – and Israel – insist (and with which Trump seems wholly comfortable). Hence the Faustian pact.

Trump’s “peacemaker” aspirations no doubt added to his electoral appeal, but they were not the real driver to his landslide. What has become evident is that these diverse agendas – foreign and domestic – are interlinked: A set-back in one or the other acts as a domino either impelling or retarding the other agendas. Put simply: Trump is dependent on “wins” – early “wins” – even if this means rushing towards a prospective “easy win” without thinking through whether he possesses a sound strategy (and ability) to achieve it.

All of Trump’s three agenda objectives, it turns out, are more complicated and divisive than he perhaps expected. He and his team seem captivated by western-embedded assumptions such as first, that war generally happens “Over There;” that war in the post Cold War era is not actually “war” in any traditional sense of full, all-out war, but is rather a limited application of overwhelming western force against an enemy incapable of threatening “us” in a similar manner; and thirdly, that a war’s scope and duration is decided in Washington and its Deep State “twin” in London.

So those who talk about ending the Ukraine war through an imposed unilateral ceasefire (ie, the faction of Walz, Rubio and Hegseth, led by Kellogg) seem to assume blithely that the terms and timing for ending the war also can be decided in Washington, and imposed on Moscow through the limited application of asymmetric pressures and threats.

Just as China isn’t buying into the tariff and trade restriction “stuff,” neither is Putin buying into the ultimatum “stuff”: (“Moscow has weeks, not months, to agree a ceasefire”). Putin has patiently tried to explain to Witkoff, Trump’s Envoy, that the American presumption that the scope and duration of any war is very much up to the West to decide simply doesn’t gel with today’s reality.

And, in companion mode, those who talk about bombing Iran (which includes Trump) seem also to assume that they can dictate the war’s essential course and content too; the U.S. (and Israel perhaps), can simply determine to bomb Iran with big bunker-buster bombs. That’s it! End of story. This is assumed to be a self-justifying and easy war – and that Iran must learn to accept that they brought this upon themselves by supporting the Palestinians and others who refuse Israeli normalisation.

Aurelien observes:

So we are dealing with limited horizons; limited imagination and limited experience. But there’s one other determining factor: The U.S. system is recognised to be sprawling, conflictual – and, as a result, largely impervious to outside influence – and even to reality. Bureaucratic energy is devoted almost entirely to internal struggles, which are carried out by shifting coalitions in the administration; in Congress; in Punditland and in the media. But these struggles are, in general, about [domestic] power and influence – and not about the inherent merits of an issue, and [thus] require no actual expertise or knowledge.

The system is large and complex enough that you can make a career as an ‘Iran expert,’ say, inside and outside government, without ever having visited the country or speaking the language – by simply recycling standard wisdom in a way that will attract patronage. You will be fighting battles with other supposed ‘experts,’ within a very confined intellectual perimeter, where only certain conclusions are acceptable.

What becomes evident is that this cultural approach (the Think-Tank Industrial Complex) induces a laziness and the prevalence of hubris into western thinking. It is assumed reportedly, that Trump assumed that Xi Jinping would rush to meet with him, following the imposition of tariffs – to plead for a trade deal – because China is suffering some economic headwinds.

It is blandly assumed by the Kellogg contingent too that pressure is both the necessary and sufficient condition to compel Putin to agree to an unilateral ceasefire – a ceasefire that Putin repeatedly has stated he would not accept until a political framework was first agreed. When Witkoff relays Putin’s point within the Trump team discussion, he stands as a contrarian outside the “licensed discourse” which insists that Russia only takes détente with an adversary seriously after it has been forced to do so by a defeat or serious setback.

Iran too repeatedly has said that it will not be stripped naked of its conventional defences; its allies and its nuclear programme. Iran likely has the capabilities to inflict huge damage both on U.S. forces in the region and on Israel.

The Trump Team is divided on strategy here too – crudely put: to Negotiate or to Bomb.

It seems that the pendulum has swung under intense pressure from Netanyahu and the Jewish institutional leadership within the U.S.

A few words can change everything. In an about face, Witkoff shifted from saying a day earlier that Washington would be satisfied with a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment and would not require the dismantling of its nuclear facilities, to posting on his official X account that any deal would require Iran to “stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program … A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.” Without a clear reversal on this from Trump, we are on a path to war.

It is plain that Team Trump has not thought through the risks inherent to their agendas. Their initial “ceasefire meeting” with Russia in Riyadh, for example, was a theatre of the facile. The meeting was held on the easy assumption that since Washington had determined to have an early ceasefire then “it must be.”

“Famously,” Aurelien wearily notes, “the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy was the product of furious power struggles between rival American NGO and Human Rights’ alumni – none of whom knew anything about the region, or had ever been there.”

It is not just that the team is insouciant towards the possible consequences of war in the Middle East. They are captive to manipulated assumptions that it will be an easy war.

Reprinted with permission from Strategic Culture Foundation.

This year, we celebrate Divine Mercy Sunday just one day after Pope Francis is laid to rest.

Pope Francis taught that mercy is essential for Christian life and happiness. He insisted that mercy is not just a theological concept, but the lived experience of God’s closeness to us.

It is said that Pope Francis truly placed the theme of mercy at the heart of his papacy.

Through Saint Faustina, Our Lord gifted humanity with several channels to access the timeless message and incredible graces found in His Mercy.

Below are the five forms of devotion to Divine Mercy and a few bonus facts!

7 Things to Know About Divine Mercy

1) THE DIARY OF SAINT FAUSTINA

Jesus appeared to a poor Polish nun, Saint Maria Faustina Kowalska, and charged her with spreading His message of Mercy to the world.

Her more than 600 diary pages hold the message and devotion to Jesus as The Divine Mercy. The release of her diary sparked a movement that led to the spreading of the official image and devotion.

Note from Author: I will reference excerpts from the diary numerous times in this article. You can purchase your own copy on the EWTN Religious Catalogue.

2) THE DIVINE MERCY MESSAGE

The Lord’s Mercy is greater than our sins, and He desires for us to turn to Him with trust and repentance before our judgment.

The message of Divine Mercy is not new to Church teaching. Pope Benedict XVI described it as the center of the Gospel.

3) THE DIVINE MERCY IMAGE

The image was the first element of devotion revealed by Jesus on Feb. 22, 1931, and referred to as a vessel of grace!

Jesus said to Saint Faustina:

*Remember, the physical image itself is not to be worshiped! It’s a vessel/reminder of the source and reality of this image.

4) THE DIVINE MERCY CHAPLET

The Chaplet of Divine Mercy was given to Saint Faustina in 1935 during a private revelation.

It is a powerful way to meditate upon His Passion and is prayed using ordinary Rosary beads (five decades). You can find a full how-to guide here.

Jesus revealed promises attached to praying the Divine Mercy Chaplet.

5) THE HOUR OF MERCY

The hour of mercy starts at three o’clock, which is the hour Jesus died on the Cross.

Jesus explained to Saint Faustina:

6) THE FEAST OF THE DIVINE MERCY

Jesus requested the solemn celebration to be the first Sunday after Easter:

It was Saint Pope John Paul II who officially established Divine Mercy Sunday as a feast day for the entire Church.

You can find details on receiving a plenary indulgence on Divine Mercy Sunday here.

,

The Divine Mercy Novena begins on Good Friday, nine days before Divine Mercy Sunday.

The Lord said:

In giving us the Divine Mercy novena, Jesus also provided us with special intentions for each day:

The full instructions can be found here and in the Diary of Saint Faustina (1210-1229).

How are you celebrating Divine Mercy Sunday?

Francis in Full(press for full article)

Bishop Robert Barron became quite frank about Pope Francis' papacy. He begins his critique with listing the great things Pope Francis accomplished, especially being a pastoral pope and a pope of the streets with the language of the streets.

But then he turns to what needs to be refined and reset:

And yet, what one reads in almost every assessment of the late pope is that he was, at the very least, “controversial,” “confusing,” “ambiguous.” Some commentators would go so far as to say that he was heretical, undermining the ancient traditions of the Church. I do not at all subscribe to that latter position, but I sympathize to a degree with the former characterizations. Pope Francis was a puzzling figure in many ways, seeming to delight in confounding expectations, zigging when you thought he would zag. He famously told the young people gathered for World Youth Day in Rio de Janeiro to “hagan lío” (make a mess), and sometimes he appeared to take pleasure in doing just that. 

One of the messier moments of the Francis pontificate was the two-part Synod on the Family, which took place in 2014 and 2015. The fact that Walter Cardinal Kasper, a long-time advocate of allowing divorced and remarried Catholics to receive communion, spoke at the outset of the gathering indicated rather clearly the direction that Pope Francis wanted the synod to take. But he was met with stiff resistance from bishops, especially from the developing world, and when the final document appeared, the famous Amoris Laetitia, the question seemed oddly unresolved, open to a variety of interpretations. When the pope’s apologists pointed to an obscure footnote buried deep in the document as providing the requisite clarity, many in the Church were, to say the least, incredulous. And when four cardinals petitioned the pope to resolve a number of puzzles (dubia­, in the technical jargon) that Amoris Laetitia had raised in their minds, they were basically ignored. 

There are indeed many beautiful insights in Amoris Laetitia, but they were largely overlooked due to the controversy and ambiguity that accompanied the document. Indeed, in the wake of its publication, a sort of “doctrinal anarchy” was let loose, as various bishops’ conferences gave the document varying interpretations, so that, for example, what remained a mortal sin in Poland seemed permissible in Malta. If a primary responsibility of the pope is to maintain unity in doctrine and morals, it is hard to see how Pope Francis met that obligation throughout that synodal process and its aftermath. 

And he oddly did not seem to learn from this situation. In 2023, after the first round of the Synod on Synodality (more on this anon), Pope Francis’s doctrinal chief, Victor Manuel Cardinal Fernández, issued the statement Fiducia Supplicans, which allowed for the possibility of blessing those in same-sex unions. To say that a firestorm broke out in the Catholic world would be an understatement, and the opposition was led, once again, by Catholic leaders from the non-Western sphere. In an astonishing display of unity and courage, the bishops of Africa said that they would not enforce the teaching of Fiducia in their countries, and the pope backed down, permitting them to dissent from the document. That all of this unfolded immediately after a gathering of four hundred leaders from around the Catholic world, who were never consulted on the matter, simply beggars belief. Once again, the pope struggled to maintain the unity of the Church.

At times, too, the pope’s admirably generous instincts appeared to lead him into saying doctrinally imprecise things or countenancing problematic behaviors. An example of the first would be his endorsement, on a number of occasions, of the proposition that all religions are legitimate paths to God, like differing languages speaking the same truth. Now, given his clear enthusiasm for evangelization, I want to be generous in my interpretation of his words, construing them perhaps along the lines of the Second Vatican Council’s assertion that there are elements of truth in all religions. But I think it is fair to say that the pope at least gave the strong impression of religious indifferentism.  

As an example of his countenancing of problematic behaviors, I would point to the (in)famous Pachamama incident at the Synod on the Amazon in 2019. Though there remains a good deal of confusion about the purpose of the placement of the Pachamama statue in the Vatican Gardens during a prayer with the pope, it is certainly fair to say that it generated much controversy and that the various attempts to explain it only made matters worse. Once more, the pope found himself in the middle of a self-created and completely unnecessary kerfuffle, the man supposed to guarantee unity at least implicitly undermining it.

No one doubts that Pope Francis was rhetorically gifted, not in the academic manner of John Paul II or Benedict XVI to be sure, but in the manner of a parish priest adept at popular homilizing. And his speech very often had an edge. Here are a few of his gems: “Mr. and Mrs. Whiner”; “liquid Christian”; “pickled-pepper-faced Christian”; “weak to the point of rottenness”; “Church who is more spinster than mother.” And I believe it is fair to say that his rhetorical venom was, more often than not, directed at conservative Catholics. Here are a few more zingers: “the closed, legalistic slave of his own rigidity”; “doctors of the letter!”; “Rigidity conceals the leading of a double life, something pathological”; “professionals of the sacred! Reactionaries”; and, most famously, “­backwardists.” 

I know that these withering criticisms often deeply discouraged orthodox Catholics, especially young priests and seminarians, whom the pope once referred to as “little monsters.” On one occasion, during the first session of the Synod on Synodality, the pope spoke to the assembled delegates. This sort of direct papal intervention was extremely rare, for, to his credit, the pope did not want excessively to sway or dominate the discussion. He spoke, in a sarcastic tone, of young clerics in Rome who spend too much time at the clerical haberdashery shops, trying on hats, collars, and cassocks. Now, there may indeed be some immature priests and students who are preoccupied with such things, but it struck me as exceedingly strange that this was the topic the pope chose for this rare opportunity to address some of the top leadership of the Church. 

To me, it indicated a curious fixation on, and demonization of, the more conservatively minded. And what made matters even more mystifying is that Francis had to have known that the Church is flourishing precisely among its more conservative members. As the famously liberal church of Germany withers on the vine, the conservative, supernaturally-­oriented church of Nigeria is exploding in numbers. And in the West, the lively parts of the Church are, without doubt, those that embrace a vibrant orthodoxy rather than those that accommodate the secularist culture. Many of the pope’s expressions and stories were indeed funny, but one would be hard pressed to characterize them as invitations to dialogue with conservative interlocutors. 

By way of conclusion, I would like to say a few words about synodality, which I believe Francis himself would identify as his signature theme. I was privileged to be an elected delegate to both sessions of the Synod on Synodality. For two months, I listened to and spoke with representatives from all over the world, and I learned a lot about how Catholics respond to challenges in remarkably diverse cultural milieux. I very much enjoyed the conversations, both those formal exchanges around the table, and even more so, the informal chats during coffee breaks. I came to understand the pope’s Jesuit-inspired process of prayerful discernment. 

I also came, I must admit, to appreciate the limits of synodality. Though every dialogue was lively and informative, very few of them moved toward decision, judgment, or resolution. Most were stuck at what Bernard Lonergan would call the second stage of the epistemic process, namely, being intelligent or having bright ideas. They didn’t move to Lonergan’s third level, which is the act of making a judgment, much less to his fourth stage, which is that of responsible action. So respectful were we of the “process” of conversation that we had almost a phobia of coming to decision. 

This is a fatal problem for Christians entrusted with the evangelical command to announce Christ to the world. The upshot is something that I believe is repugnant to what Pope Francis has consistently said he wants the Church to be: extroverted, mission-oriented, not stuck in the sacristy. I wondered at times during the two rounds of the synod whether synodality represented a tension within the mind and heart of Francis himself. 

Of all of the popes in my lifetime, Francis is, by far, the one I knew the best. I was with him for three Octobers: the two already mentioned, and a third for the Synod on Young People in 2018. During those wonderful months, I saw him practically every day and had a few occasions to speak to him. I also encountered him on an ad limina visit and at a handful of other audiences. I always found him gracious, funny, and approachable; once we had a short but intense spiritual conversation. I considered him my spiritual father and sincerely mourn his passing. Requiescat in pace.

A Peace Deal or a Deception

Is Putin Again Being Deceived, or Are Putin and Trump Deceiving Their Own Populations?

Paul Craig Roberts

The details of the peace deal presented  by US special envoy Steve Witkoff are consistent with the report in the Financial Times discussed in my previous article and with Larry Sparano in the posted interview.  Putin will halt the Russian advance prior to driving Ukrainian soldiers out of all of the territory that has been reincorporated into Russia.  It appears to be the case that the borders between Russia and Ukraine will be the current front line, so Putin is withdrawing Russia’s claim to the Russian territories still under Ukrainian occupation.

In exchange Washington will give de jure, that is legal, by right, recognition to Crimea as a constituent part of Russia, and Washington will give de facto, that is accept the facts on the ground whether legal or not, recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporozhye, and Kherson as provinces of Russia according to the present boundaries in the conflict.

By withholding de jure recognition of Russia’s battlefield gains, Ukraine can continue to claim, and demand return of, Russia’s battlefield gains. In other words, the agreement evades the central issue.

According to the agreement, Ukraine must renounce all NATO aspirations.  But Putin’s other demands, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine are apparently not included in the agreement.

Washington will lift the sanctions against Russia, and there will be US-Russia economic cooperation, which seems to mean that Russia will open aspects of its economy to foreigners for exploitation, a disastrous Russian decision.

This is what the Russian oligarchs and Atlanticist Integrationists, who have never supported the war, want.  How the Russia’s military feels about victory being shoved aside by a negotiated settlement is unknown.

But is it a settlement?  Zelensky’s latest statement at this time of writing is that he will not concede a square inch of territory to Russia.  If Zelensky has to be coerced, and as he is not legally or constitutionally the current president of Ukraine as his term of office has expired, successive Ukrainian governments can legitimately claim that the agreement is not valid.

Moreover,  Ukraine and Europe have placed themselves behind an alternative agreement.  In their proposed agreement, Ukraine will consent to begin talks with Russia, Europe, and the US about the territorial issues. Moreover, Ukraine will be granted US security guarantees similar to Article 5 in the NATO treaty.  In other words, Ukraine becomes essentially a de facto member of NATO.  Additionally, there will be no restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces or on the operations of foreign forces on Ukrainian territory, and Russia will compensate Ukraine for war damage.

Clearly, the two proposals have nothing in common.  Unless Europe gives in to Trump, a split is implied between the US and NATO, a split that could leave the US and Russia in an alliance that excludes Europe.  I have no explanation why Europe is taking this risk.

As we can see from the facts, only two of the four parties agree to the deal. Moreover, even if there is a deal, in the absence of de jure recognition of Russia’s territorial claims, the deal amounts to little more than kicking the can down the road.

In fact, John Helmer says that the deal is just a mechanism, a cover, for moving Russia aside so that Washington can get on with its war with China.

Here is how Helmer describes the situation:

“The politico-military strategy driving the US negotiators and prompting Trump’s tweets, is not a peace deal with Russia, nor even US withdrawal from the war in Europe. It is a strategy of sequencing one war at a time – the war in Europe to continue in the Ukraine with rearmed Germany, Poland and France in the lead, supported by Trump; and the US war against China in Asia.

“Sequencing these wars so as not to fight both enemies simultaneously – that’s the formula devised for Trump by Wess Mitchell, a former State Department appointee in the first Trump Administration,  and his business partner Elbridge Colby, now the third-ranking Pentagon official as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.   ‘The essence of diplomacy in strategy,’ Mitchell has just declaimed in Foreign Affairs, ‘is to rearrange power in space and time so that countries avoid tests of strength beyond their ability.’ . .

“Mitchell and Colby have convinced Trump and his negotiators that Russia has been badly damaged by the Ukrainian war which the Obama and Biden Administration have fought. Russian weakness, especially the perception that President Putin is both politically vulnerable and personally susceptible to US business inducements, is Trump’s strong card, and he should play it now.”

The goal is not peace, but to make money off of two wars: Europe and Ukraine’s war with Russia, and Washington’s war with China.  And perhaps a war with Iran for Israel thrown in.

Readers can listen to Helmer’s presentation of what he says is actually occurring in his discussion with Ray McGovern on Nima Alkhorshid’s program ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgG4ZmTZQww ), and they can read it in several of Helmer’s recent articles in Dancing with Bears ( https://johnhelmer.net/one-war-at-a-time-and-plenty-of-money-to-be-made-in-the-meantime-this-is-trumps-game-as-the-russian-and-chinese-general-staffs-understand/ ).

Helmer’s source for his explanation of what is really happening is an article in Foreign Affairs by West Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia in the first Trump term.  Mitchell is currently working with Trump’s current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to sequence America’s wars with Russia and China as the US lacks the power to take on both simultaneously. Mitchell’s article was published on April 22, 2025, in the May/June 2025 issue of Foreign Affairs.

Mitchell writes that the process of sequencing the wars with Russia and China should  begin “by bringing the war in Ukraine to an end in a way that is favorable to the United States. That means that when all is said and done, Kyiv must be strong enough to impede Russia’s westward advances” [for which no evidence exists, showing Mitchell’s mind to be controlled by the false narrative]. Washington should use the Korean War formula: “prioritize an armistice and push questions about a wider settlement into a separate process that could take years to bear fruit, it it ever does.”  This, of course, is what Washington’s de facto recognition of Russia’s territorial claims ensures.

Mitchell carelessly then reveals the intended deception of Babe-in-the-Woods Putin: “The United States should pursue a defense relationship with Ukraine akin to the one it maintains with Israel: not a formal alliance, but an agreement to sell, lend, or give Kyiv what it needs to defend itself. But it should not grant Ukraine [ de jure ] NATO membership. Instead, the United States should push European states to take responsibility for Ukraine—and for the security of their continent more generally.” This strategy capitalizes “on Putin’s special relationship with the Russian oligarchs” and dupes Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s negotiator, ” into pressing the Kremlin to accept a short-term military armistice which stops well short of the demilitarization and denazification goals of the Special Military Operation.”

So, as Mitchell describes it, the “peace agreement” is a Washington deception to set up, yet again,  “Babe-in-the Woods Putin” for the eventual destruction of Russia.

Can I believe this?  Yes, I can.  Helmer has  been watching things for a long time and reporting on them.  This scenario is not a product of Helmer’s imagination.  It is spelled out in an article in Foreign Affairs, long the arbiter of American foreign policy. The author, West Mitchell, a former Trump high official, clearly holds to the neoconservative policy stated by Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfwitz that the purpose of American foreign policy is hegemony over the world. If American hegemony requires war, war it is.

The Russians, with a large part of the mindless Russian establishment so desirous of being part of the West, have never paid any attention to the implication for Russian sovereignty of the neoconservative doctrine of US hegemony. This doctrine has not been denounced by President Trump. Consequently, Russia will be destroyed as the Russian government stupidly walks into deception after deception. Under Putin and Lavrov it will be one Minsk Agreement after another.

The question I have is:  Is Trump a part of the deception not only of Putin but also of the American people, or is this a deal he has accepted without realizing its consequences because he is desperate to end the conflict as he promised?  If Trump himself is part of the deception, then we have the explanation why the American Establishment did not prevent his reappearance in the Oval Office.

“The Return of Great-Power Diplomacy, How Strategic  Dealmaking Can Fortify American Power, by A. West Mitchell, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-great-power-diplomacy-strategy-wess-mitchell?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20250424