In a blog post overnight, the OpenAI Board revealed that its nonprofit arm would retain control of the chatbot company following backlash over its attempt to restructure into a for-profit business.

"We made the decision for the nonprofit to retain control of OpenAI after hearing from civic leaders and engaging in constructive dialogue with the offices of the Attorney General of Delaware and the Attorney General of California," the OpenAI Board wrote in a blog post. 

Last fall, OpenAI's Sam Altman was preparing to overhaul the company's structure and transition to a for-profit business—an effort that sparked a heated legal battle with co-founder Elon Musk, who sought to keep OpenAI 'open'.

The board provided new details about OpenAI's evolving structure:

• OpenAI was founded as a nonprofit, and is today overseen and controlled by that nonprofit. Going forward, it will continue to be overseen and controlled by that nonprofit.

• Our for-profit LLC, which has been under the nonprofit since 2019, will transition to a Public Benefit Corporation (PBC)–a purpose-driven company structure that has to consider the interests of both shareholders and the mission.

• The nonprofit will control and also be a large shareholder of the PBC, giving the nonprofit better resources to support many benefits.

• Our mission remains the same, and the PBC will have the same mission.

"We want our nonprofit to be the largest and most effective nonprofit in history that will be focused on using AI to enable the highest-leverage outcomes for people," Altman wrote in a letter to employees. 

He also provided details about OpenAI's evolving structure:

• OpenAI's nonprofit will remain in control of the organization after discussions with civic leaders and attorneys general from California and Delaware.

• The for-profit LLC will convert to a Public Benefit Corporation (PBC)—a mission-aligned model also used by other AI labs like Anthropic and X.ai.

• This move replaces the old capped-profit structure with a simpler equity-based model, but does not represent a sale.

• The nonprofit will retain oversight and become a major shareholder in the PBC, giving it more resources to advance AI for broad societal benefit.

• A new nonprofit commission will help guide efforts to ensure AI supports public good in areas like health, education, science, and public services.

• OpenAI says this new structure will enable it to make faster and safer progress toward its mission of democratizing AGI.

Meanwhile, Marc Toberoff, lead counsel for Elon Musk in the ongoing lawsuit against OpenAI, told Bloomberg via email that Altman's decision to scale back for-profit plans "changes nothing."

"OpenAI's announcement is a transparent dodge that fails to address the core issues: charitable assets have been and still will be transferred for the benefit of private persons, including Altman, his investors and Microsoft," Toberoff said.

In March, US District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers blocked Musk's request to stop Altman from restructuring OpenAI into a for-profit company. This led the judge to expedite a trial for this fall.

Given "the public interest at stake and potential for harm if a conversion contrary to law occurred," Rogers said, adding that an expedited trial later this year would be on "core" claim that OpenAI's structure conversion plan is unlawful and "potentially the interrelated contract-based claims."

Earlier this year, a Musk-led group offered to purchase OpenAI for around $100 billion, a bid that was quickly rejected.

Authored by Conor Gallagher via NakedCapitalism.com,

Donald Trump is the gift that keeps on giving for the western misleadership class. Any anti-democratic swindle on the EU wish list is now being sold as a remedy to the Orange Man. (And if it’s not Trump, it’s Russia).

The US is no longer a reliable defense partner, they say. 

We must give more power to Brussels and send untold billions to weapons companies.

The US is no longer a reliable economic partner, they say. 

We must increase competitiveness by weakening labor and empowering finance.

The UK voters may have opted for Brexit, but London and Brussels are “defying Trump” with a “free and open trade” declaration that includes negotiations ‘on defense and security, fishing and energy, as well as a “common understanding” of which topics will be covered by intensive Brexit reset negotiations this year.’

The strange thing about these plans, however, is that they include reliance on US weapons and energy and alignment with US geopolitical and geoeconomic goals.

Let’s focus here on how the EU is pressing ahead with plans to dramatically increase defense spending due to Trump Abandonment Syndrome.

The EU Jazz Band

Recent commentary by Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe, perfectly sums up these arguments. In a piece titled “Europe Tried to Trump-Proof Itself. Now It’s Crafting a Plan B” she explains why the EU has no choice but to redirect social spending towards the arms industry.

Balfour’s romantic version of recent history starts on February 28. That’s when “the televised humiliation of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky” took place, and “Europe realized it could no longer rely on its longtime ally, the United States.” And here she is on the jazzy wreckage:

The shocking depth and breadth of this realization cannot be overemphasized. Political leaders in European states, the European Union, and NATO displayed composure and coordination, but behind the scenes, the soundtrack was a frantic free jazz jam session with dramatic thuds and a long pause—the silence at the realization that the European comfort zone was over.

And now, what are these composed and coordinated “political leaders” doing? They announce that Ukraine is Europe’s first line of defense, make grand plans for a “coalition of the willing,” and declare that Ukraine will become a “steel porcupine”

The coalition of the willing has fallen apart. The steel porcupine was ridiculed.  And while those in the Kremlin likely aren’t losing any sleep, Europeans should be. That’s because, as Balfour writes, the European Commission “can play supporting roles by mobilizing financial resources and handling complicated in-house horse trading.”

That’s one way of putting it.

The Commission is inching its way towards invoking emergency powers to push through parts of its rearmament slush fund. It’s getting pushback from the European Parliament, but the fact is Ursula can do it anyways with minimal support from EU governments. She’s likely just waiting for the right moment. Let’s look at the status of the European militarization billions.

On March 19, the Commission introduced a 150 billion euro proposal — a first installment of what’s to be at least $900 billion— for establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument.

It wants to move forward with it under Article 122 emergency powers which need only a qualified majority in the Council —as opposed to the usual consensus— which allows Ursula and friends to get around pesky vetoes from member countries. The procedure for 122 is as follows:

1) the Commission proposes a Council measure; following which 2) the Council adopts the measure in line with [qualified majority voting]. No additional elements or participants are envisaged.

This article allows the proposal to bypass parliamentary negotiations and go straight to the Council for negotiation and adoption. The Parliament’s role is reduced to submitting suggestions and requesting debates.

How’s that for your democratic rules-based order?

In an April 23 secret vote, the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affair unanimously backed a legal opinion rejecting the Commission’s attempt to bypass it on a 150 billion euro rearmament fund.

While it is a non-binding vote, it does signal opposition to Ursula’s plan, but it’s not some principled stand for the will of the people or any romantic notion like that.

No, it’s more about dividing up slices of the pie as European weapons industry lobbyists are increasingly active in Brussels and are trying to make sure their clients are rewarded. And so much of the feeble opposition is over getting a stronger “buy European” clause in SAFE (it currently requires 65 percent of war consumables and complex systems to come from within the EU, Ukraine, or EEA/EFTA states, which includes Turkiye and Norway.

Why must Ursula’s commission sideline the Parliament and some member states in order to spend 900 billion on military purchases? They lay it out in their proposal. There’s the usual nonsense about Russia:

The EU and its Member States now face an intensifying Russian aggression against Ukraine and a growing security threat from Russia. It is also now clear that this threat will persist in the foreseeable future, considering that Russia has shifted to a war-time economy enabling a rapid scaleup of its military capabilities and replenishment of its stocks. The European Council therefore underlined, in its conclusions of 6 March 2025, that “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its repercussions for European and global security in a changing environment constitute an existential challenge for the European Union”.

There’s also the Trump abandonment syndrome:

At the same time, the United States, traditionally a strong ally, is clear that it believes it is over-committed in Europe and needs to rebalance, reducing its historical role as a primary security guarantor.

One itching question is what happens to this latter selling point now that the Trump administration has tied itself to Ukraine through the so-called minerals deal, but surely if the European powers have made it this far on manufactured crises, they’ll be able to overcome that hurdle by pointing to Trump’s insistence on what they call an unjust peace for Ukraine.

And so “rearmament” by supranational emergency decree it must be—with Balfour from Carnegie and all the other plutocrat court jesters at the transatlantic think tanks cheering this on as a victory against the autocratic hordes outside the garden walls. Here’s Balfour again summarizing the mood among this crowd:

…a trajectory of change has been charted, and it has transformative potential—not just for the European continent, but also for the global reordering of post-American international relations. The jazz band has picked up rhythm, even if the melody is not fully harmonic.

I’m not sure if that’s music Balfour is listening to or the jangle of gold and silver. While it can be difficult to hear anything over the din coming from the elite ‘Spirit of 1914,’ there’s always one chord missing from the militarization genre. Surely Balfour, the jazz aficionado, must know that curiosity was considered one of the essential ingredients to the music. If we apply that to her extended jazz metaphor we might start asking some questions like:

• Why does the EU need to perform this whole militarization song and dance routine at all?

• Why can’t there be peace with Russia?

• Why did European nations help sabotage past Kiev-Moscow peace negotiations?

• Why did the EU help the US overthrow the government of Ukraine and use the country as a battering ram against Russia?

• Why does the EU elite so crave war with Russia?

• Is the EU not more secure and prosperous through friendly ties and trade with Russia?

And why must the EU, which collectively already ranks second in the world in defense expenditures, spend boatloads more? How much will make it safe, competitive, and independent?

These questions are never addressed. It’s simply treated as the natural order of things that Russia is the EU’s enemy and it must get big expensive weapons because Trump bad. The sad thing is, this relentless messaging pumped out of European media is working — at least according to the EU’s own polls. That wouldn’t be entirely surprising considering this message is endlessly pumped out of EU media.

Either way, European governments are running with it. Sixteen countries are asking the EU for fiscal leeway to spend big on defense — requests that are never made during the endless social austerity.

Yes, the citizens of the bloc will continue to see their standard of living fall, but don’t worry, EU enlargement and spending more on militarization will lead to more “competitiveness.” Can’t you feel it already:

Profit margins for Weapon and Ammunition at Rheinmetall went up from 23% to 28.5% from 2023 to 2024. Of every Euro in public money spent on weapons from Rheinmetall, the company makes 28.5% return on sales, quite spectacular even compared to other Rheinmetall business. pic.twitter.com/SvKmjNcB30

Despite considerable hurdles for the European defense industry (and a brief cooling off period due to tariff shock), their stock prices are going through the roof as investors expect Brussels to come through with endless support.

About those hurdles…

Research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that Europe increased its imports of weapons two-and-a-half times over in the past five years compared with the previous five years with two-thirds coming from the US.

Even others at Carnegie Europe have doubts about the EU scheme. Here’s Judy Dempsey, nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe:

Tell Poland. It is rapidly building up its defense infrastructure by purchasing  American kits. When Warsaw wanted to shop elsewhere, like in South Korea, it came under huge pressure from Washington not to do so. This is an important point. The United States wants Europe to take more responsibility for its defense but not at America’s military industrial expense. It is a major military supplier of components to many European countries. Making that break would take time and a political will for Europe to build up a common defense and procurement strategy.

Beyond the considerable political pressure, there’s also the fact that lead times when it comes to defense capabilities are long. So part of the EU’s strategy is to send billions more to Ukraine so it can build up its defense industry. The rationale is that it is a far cheaper place to manufacture weapons than Western Europe, and it already has a defense manufacturing sector up and running. Okay, then.

But are there some chinks in that logic?

For one, Ukraine is now the world’s biggest arms importer, absorbing 8.8 percent of global transfers. Two, Russian Kinzhals might have a say in the output from Ukrainian weapons manufacturers.

It’s hard to see what this all does for European competitiveness, let alone the average Josef, Jose, or Giusseppe. Here’s Balfour on this should be sold to the proles:

Politically, to ensure public support for rearming Europe and to offset the inevitable costs, defense efforts ought to be part of a broader strategy of economic and technological innovation. Indeed, these efforts could boost Europe’s stagnant economy. At the EU level, the recipes are available in recent recommendations addressing competitiveness, productivity, and technological innovation.

Indeed, Trump’s first 100 days are pushing the EU to put some momentum behind projects that have been underway for years. Tying these objectives with the enlargement of the EU to include Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans adds a new perspective to upscaling the single market. Expanding the EU and deepening the relationship with other European countries—like the UK, Switzerland, and Norway—would counter the fragmentation that great power competition and political disruption at home are inflicting on the continent.

It’s scary for its rote, simplistic confidence. Nowhere in this hopeful Powerpoint is there an appearance of the considerable downsides, which at the more disastrous end of the spectrum happen to include the complete destruction of Europe.

Perhaps the best hope is that these fools’ plans for EU rearmament plans are just a giant racket. But one could say the same about the US military industrial complex, and look at what that has unfurled: endless death and destruction and numerous lost wars. One key difference between the transatlantic militarization schemes, however, is that the US is isolated between two oceans. The EU borders not only Russia, but also a collapsing neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine, making its embrace of a military-industrial complex a far riskier proposition.

Rackets have a way of taking on a life of their own. Indeed, one could argue the EU’s current trajectory is that of a zombie driven along by its Russophobia — and redistributing money upwards in the name of that hatred. Problem is that life expectancy isn’t long for zombies and those around them.

Authored by Dave DeCamp via AntiWar.com,

The State Department has approved a potential $310.5 million arms sale to Ukraine for training and sustainment of the country’s fleet of US-made F-16 fighter jets, signaling that the Trump administration is preparing to provide long-term military support.

The Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the sale will include aircraft modifications, upgrades, personnel training, maintenance, sustainment support, and other types of equipment.

Image: Office of the Ukrainian President

Several of the US’s European allies have provided Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, and the US, under the Biden administration, was involved in training Ukrainian pilots. A report from The War Zone just revealed that the US has been providing Ukraine with decommissioned, non-operational F-16 fighter jets.

A US Air Force spokesman told The War Zone that the Air Force has "supported the sustainment of European-donated F-16s to Ukraine by providing disused and completely non-operational F-16s to Ukraine for parts."

"These F-16s were retired from active US use and are not flyable. Importantly, they lack critical components such as an engine or radar and could not be reconstituted for operational use," the statement said.

The approval of the F-16 training and sustainment deal came a few days after the Trump administration moved forward with its very first arms sale for Ukraine by notifying Congress of its plans to approve the export of unspecified "defense articles" worth $50 million or more.

That first sale is being moved forward as a direct commercial sale (DCS), a deal where the State Department gives a private company permission to sell weapons directly to a foreign government. The F-16 training and sustainment deal is a Foreign Military Sale (FMS), which involves the US government in the sale.

The US-Ukraine minerals deal signed last week also signals that the US is planning to provide long-term military support.

U.S. President Donald Trump says "tremendous hatred" between Russia and Ukraine may block peace talks. Saying 5,000 soldiers per week are dying, Trump said “if I can save 5,000 souls, I just love doing it."#UkraineWar #Trump #PeaceTalks #RussiaUkraine pic.twitter.com/dJwT2zMiei

Under the agreement, future US military aid will count as a contribution to a joint US-Ukraine investment fund. Critics have said this ensures the US is even more intertwined in Ukraine's fate.

This year's World Press Freedom Index highlights the economic situation of journalists and media organizations being a major risk to press freedom, as "today’s news media are caught between preserving their editorial independence and ensuring their economic survival".

Due to the economic indicator of the index decreasing by more than two points in one year and the other subindices measuring the security, social, political and legal situation of the press also losing at least some ground since 2024, the overall index entered into "difficult" territory for the first time in 2025.

"Without economic independence, there can be no free press. When news media are financially strained, they are drawn into a race to attract audiences", Anne Bocandé, RSF's Editorial Director said.

Statista's Katharina Buchholz reports that in 160 out of the 180 countries included in the report, media outlets reported achieving financial stability only “with difficulty” or “not at all.” In a third of all countries, significant news outlets shutting down were recorded, extending to developing and developed countries.

You will find more infographics at Statista

In the U.S., the indicator dropped much more than the global average, by 5.4 points, and news deserts where local media coverage lacks were becoming the norm, the report states. 

Additionally, the report claims that Trump administration cuts to the U.S. Agency for Global Media, affecting the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty newsrooms, added to economic difficulty and deprived over 400 million citizens worldwide of access to reliable information. 

USAID cuts also affected journalists all over the world who had received funding, including in Ukraine.

The security, social and legal situation of journalists in a worldwide average continues to be rated as "not difficult", if only slightly so at ratings between 58 and 67 points (where anything under 55 signals a difficult situation). The political situation of global media has been rated as "difficult" since last year, while the economic situation of the press has been in difficult territory for longer. 

However, in 2025, it reached a new low of just 44.1 points.

Today, Czechia officially recognizes beer culture as part of its national heritage, with 96% brewed domestically.

What’s more, Czechs hold the world’s highest per capita beer consumption, a tradition dating back to 993.

Similarly, Germany and Belgium also recognize beer culture as official heritage and rank among the top beer-drinking nations, thanks to its enduring place in their national cultures.

This graphic, via Visual Capitalist's Dorothy Neufeld, shows the countries that consume the most beer per capita, based on data from Kirin Holdings.

Czechia Ranks First in Per Capita Beer Consumption

For the 31st year in a row, Czechia tops the list, even amid an annual decline.

Notably, the original Budweiser traces its roots in the country, where beer from the South Bohemian region is called “Budweiser”. In 1876, a German immigrant in the U.S. adopted the name for his brewery, paying homage to the traditional Czech style.

Below, we show the top 35 countries with the highest beer consumption per capita:

Ranking in second is Austria, where pale lagers, known as “Märzen” are the standard beer.

Meanwhile, Lithuania and Ireland follow closely behind, where the average person drinks over 100 liters of beer in a year. In Ireland, Guinness is widely considered the national beer, with the original St. James Gate brewery now over 260 years old.

Interestingly, however, both the UK and Nigeria consume more Guinness than Ireland, thanks to their vibrant beer cultures. In fact, one in 10 beers sold in the UK is a Guinness.

If we look beyond Europe, Panama, Mexico, Gabon, and South Africa also rank among the top 20 countries

To learn more about this topic from a wine-based perspective, check out this graphic on which U.S. states consume the most wine.

Authored by Mark Nayler via the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE),

Europe is once again talking about forming its own defense alliance. The idea of a European army—discussed on and off since the early days of the Cold War—was revived in February by Volodymyr Zelensky. The Ukrainian president claims that Donald Trump’s retraction of military support for Ukraine and ambivalence towards the EU shows that the bloc urgently needs its own military unit. Zelenskyy has reignited a debate that has failed to generate consensus within Europe, despite its long history.

Spain’s Socialist prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, is the latest EU leader to echo Zelenskyy—and according to a YouGov poll conducted in 2022, 64 percent of Spaniards are on his side. On March 28, he announced that Europe needs its own defense force to combat “old imperialist impulses in Russia,” especially in light of reduced support from the US. He called for a military force “with troops from all 27 member countries, working under a single flag with the same objectives.” Sánchez also wants greater economic integration within the bloc, and recently proposed a debt mutualization scheme—which has caused division along similar lines as the idea of a 27-nation army.

Despite Sánchez’s crusading rhetoric, one suspects there’s a self-interested motivation behind his call for an EU army. He is under intense pressure from both the EU and the United States to increase Spain’s defense spending; but anti-military sentiment in the country is strong, and he governs in partnership with Sumar, a leftist alliance that opposes increased investment in arms and troops. By claiming that EU defense is a collective, rather than national, responsibility, Sánchez no doubt hopes to deflect attention from his own difficulties.

The EU does collaborate on defense to some extent. At any one time, at least one multinational Battle Group, consisting of 1,500 troops, is on standby. These reached operational capacity in 2007, but according to the multinational military headquarters Eurocorps, “issues relating to political will, usability, and financial solidarity have prevented them from being deployed.” Precisely the same problems would arise within an EU army, of course—but on a much larger scale. There is also the European Maritime Force, formed in 1995 by Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal to conduct sea control, crisis response operations, and humanitarian missions. Advocates of an EU army argue that while these collaborative forces are an important pillar of the bloc’s defense, they are not equipped for long-running conflicts. They also claim that the EU is too dependent on the US for protection—a point on which Trump 2.0 completely agrees.

The notion of an EU army was first suggested in the early 1950s as a way of building capability against the Soviet Union without rearming West Germany. Proposed by the French government, it would have consisted of the EU’s six founding members—France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, and Belgium. A treaty creating the European Defence Community was signed in 1952, but never ratified; instead, West Germany joined NATO and the Western Union, a military alliance formed in 1948, and the idea was shelved.

This decades-old idea was revived in 2016. Then, as now, a perceived threat from Russia was intensified by the sudden withdrawal of a military heavyweight. Following the Brexit referendum, in which 52 percent of the UK opted to leave the EU, the prime ministers of Hungary and the Czech Republic called for a European army. They were joined by Ursula von der Leyen—then Germany’s defense minister—who said that Europe needed a “Schengen of defense”—a reference to the continent’s border-free Schengen Area, made up of 29 nations (four of which are outside the EU). Jean-Claude Juncker, her predecessor as president of the EU Commission, had said a year earlier that the EU needed its own army in order to “convey a clear message to Russia that we are serious about defending our European values.” Whenever those are perceived to be in danger, the old idea of an EU army is reanimated.

Since Brexit, it has steadily gained traction. The idea was endorsed in 2018 by Angela Merkel, then the German chancellor, and French president Emmanuel Macron. A furious Trump, at that point halfway through his first term, saw it as an act of ingratitude towards NATO: “They were starting to learn German in Paris before the US came along,” he tweeted (a misleading reference to World War II). Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU Commission since 2019, has called for a “European Defence Union,” and last month unveiled “Rearm Europe”—a five-year plan quickly rebranded “Readiness 2030,” after Spain and Italy complained that the original title was too militaristic. (Sánchez didn’t explain how that objection sits with his demand for an EU fighting force, presumably armed with more than goodwill.) Von der Leyen plans to mobilize €800 billion for the bloc’s defense over the next five years, by which point some analysts believe Russia could be ready to attack a member of NATO or the EU. Italy’s foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, also supports the idea of an EU army.

But Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign affairs chief and vice president of the EU Commission, claims that it’s not necessary. What’s more important, she says, is that the bloc’s 27 armies “are capable and can effectively work together to deter our rivals and defend Europe.” She is supported by Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, who is adamant that an EU army “will not happen,” and Denmark, which has historically seen NATO as the continent’s primary defense mechanism. During its membership of the bloc, the UK opposed the idea of an EU army for the same reason, arguing that it would unnecessarily duplicate NATO.

One of the major practical difficulties is how a 27-nation army would be funded. The issue of mutual financing has also arisen over the EU’s call for members to increase their national defense budgets—and there is no agreement there, either. Rather than the cheap loans suggested by von der Leyen as part of the “Readiness 2030” plan, heavily indebted southern nations such as Spain and Italy favor common defense bonds, or grants similar to those distributed during the pandemic. The suggestion has revived a long-standing grievance amongst wealthier northern members such as Germany and the Netherlands, which are reluctant to fund joint initiatives: “No Eurobonds,” said Dutch prime minister Dick Schoof after a meeting of EU leaders in late March. Another possibility, as recently suggested by France’s economy minister, is increasing taxes, especially on the wealthy.

Sánchez claims the EU should reconsider the idea of a joint army because its individual members have been unable to find common ground on defense. But that same problem would likely prevent the creation of an EU fighting force. Since their formation almost twenty years ago, none of the EU’s Battle Groups—which typically consist of troops from three or four countries—have been activated. This hardly suggests that the bloc is ready to form a 27-nation army, controlled from Brussels and entering battle under a blue-and-gold flag.

Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack,

Bangladesh’s increasing alignment with China and Pakistan could imperil India’s Great Power plans...

Bangladeshi Major General (retired) A.L.M. Fazlur Rahman, who serves as chair of the National Independent Commission of Inquiry investigating the 2009 Bangladesh Rifles massacre, posted on Facebook that Bangladesh should occupy India’s Northeastern States if India goes to war with Pakistan. He later explained that preparing for this scenario might deter India, which could in turn prevent Pakistan’s possible defeat, thus averting the existential threat that India would then pose to Bangladesh.

The incumbent government, which came to power after last summer’s US-backed regime change, distanced itself from his post but the damage to bilateral trust was done. Rahman’s words followed interim Bangladeshi leader Muhammad Yunus’ scandalous comments about India’s Northeastern States during a trip to China earlier this year. They were analyzed here at the time as a veiled threat to once again host Indian-designated terrorist-separatist groups if India doesn’t make concessions to Bangladesh.

This year’s two territorial controversies thus far were preceded by Yunus’ special assistant Mahfuj Alam sharing a provocative map on X in late December that made claims to surrounding Indian states, with these sequential developments altogether ringing alarm bells in Delhi about Dhaka’s intentions. Although each were “plausibly deniable” in that no official territorial claims were made, the trend is unmistakable, and it’s that the new Bangladeshi authorities are weaponizing fears of this scenario.

From their ultra-nationalist perspective, this is a pragmatic means to rebalance what they consider to be Bangladesh’s lopsided relations with much larger India, but it risks backfiring by heightening Delhi’s threat perceptions with all that entails. In the current context of India signaling that it might launch at least one surgical strike against Pakistan in retaliation for last month’s Pahalgam terrorist attack, Indian military planners can’t confidently rule out that Pakistan might coordinate its response with Bangladesh.

To make matters worse, Rahman also wrote in his two posts that Bangladesh “needs to start discussing a joint military system with China”, which lays claim to India’s Northeastern State of Arunachal Pradesh. Seeing as how there’s always the possibility that another Indo-Pak war could lead to China intervening on Pakistan’s side, which Indian military planners call the two-front war scenario, this latest twist could lead to a three-front war as the incumbent Bangladeshi government aligns closer with both against India.

India already felt that it was becoming encircled by China over the past decade, but this might soon evolve into a siege mentality if ties with Bangladesh continue to worsen due to its officials’ rhetoric. The new regional security system that’s taking shape as Bangladesh de facto incorporates itself into the Sino-Pak nexus could decisively shift the balance of power against India. In response, India might intensify the military dimension of its strategic partnership with the US, albeit more on the US’ terms than before.

India cherishes its strategic autonomy, which is why it’s thus far declined to participate in the US’ multilateral containment of China, but that could change if the US informally makes more military-strategic support of India depend on this. 

Amidst its increasing encirclement that might soon evolve into a siege mentality as explained, India might feel that it has no choice but to concede to this so as to avoid being coerced into concessions by China, either scenario of which could imperil its Great Power plans.